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Abstract
This report describes the domain model used in the German Machine Translation
project VERBMOBIL. In order make the design principles underlying the model-
ing explicit, we begin with a brief sketch of the VERBMOBIL demonstrator ar-
chitecture from the perspective of the domain model. We then present some rather
general considerations on the nature of domain modeling and its relationship to
semantics.
We claim that the semantic information contained in the model mainly serves
two tasks. For one thing, it provides the basis for a conceptual transfer from Ger-
man to English; on the other hand, it provides information needed for disambigua-
tion. We argue that these tasks pose different requirements, and that domain mod-
eling in general is highly task-dependent. A brief overview of domain models or
ontologies used in existing NLP systems confirms this position.
We finally describe the different parts of the domain model, explain our design
decisions, and present examples of how the information contained in the model can
be actually used in the VERBMOBIL demonstrator. In doing so, we also point out
the main functionality of FLEX, the Description Logic system used for the mod-
eling.
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31 Introduction
In this report we describe Version 1.0 of the VERBMOBIL domain model. This ver-
sion contains
1. a hierarchy of speech-event types relevant for the demonstrator scenario, i.e.
appointment scheduling;
2. a conceptual hierarchy covering the word list used in the demonstrator;
3. thematic relations used for conceptually representing linguistic functor-
argument structures;
4. a model of calendar information for representing temporal descriptions.
The main objective of this report is to describe both the current domain model and
the methodology underlying the modeling. To understand this methodology it is
useful to take a closer look at the various tasks supported by the domain model in
VERBMOBIL. We therefore start with a sketch of the VERBMOBIL-demonstrator
architecture from the perspective of the domain model (Section 2). In Section 3
we then present some rather general considerations on the nature of domain mod-
eling and its relationship to semantics. Section 4 then describes the different tasks
supported by the domain model. We will argue that these tasks pose different re-
quirements, and that domain modeling in general is highly task-dependent. A brief
overview of domain models or ontologies used in existing NLP systems (Section 5)
confirms this position.
In Section 6 we describe the different parts of the domain model and explain
our design decisions. Section 7 then gives examples of how the information con-
tained in the domain model can be actually used in the VERBMOBIL demonstrator.
We end the report with a brief overview over our future activities concerning do-
main modeling.
Some readers may wonder why we included a rather long “philosophical” sec-
tion on the task of semantics. We included Section 3 mainly because of the het-
erogeneity of the research background of the various research groups involved in
VERBMOBIL. The discussions at project meetings and workshops in the first year
have shown that the different project partners start from rather different assump-
tions concerning objectives and methodology. 
 Section 3 is thus meant as an explanation of our own objectives and methodology. Those read-
ers not interested in “philosophical” discussions might choose to skip this section.
4 1. INTRODUCTION
Given the heterogeneity of research contexts, we think that two dichotomies
are particularly obvious and important:
1. Logico-Linguistic (LL) semantics vs Artificial Intelligence (AI) semantics;
2. theory-oriented research vs application-oriented research.
Though there is a slight correspondence between these dichotomies, i.e. AI seman-
tics tend to be application oriented, whereas LL semantics tend to be theory ori-
ented, we think that separating both aspects is useful.
A distinction between AI semantics and LL semantics has been suggested in
[Pinkal 88]. AI semantics are based on representation formats as Semantic Nets
[Quillian 68], Frames [Minsky 75], or Scripts. LL semantics are based on Mon-
tague’s initial work [Montague 74] and comprise Montague Semantics [Dowty et
al. 81], Discourse Representation Theory [Kamp, Reyle 93] , and Situation Seman-
tics [Barwise, Perry 83]. Pinkal sketches some of the main differences between
both research areas concerning the subject of research, the ontological and method-
ological assumptions, etc. We think that the most important difference between
the two research paradigms concerns the status of semantic representations. Not
surprisingly, AI semantics is interested in the computational aspects of semantic
representation, more precisely it addresses two questions:
1. Given an NL expression, how can the computer determine an appropriate
semantic representation?
2. Given the semantic representation of an NL expression, how can the com-
puter draw inferences from it?
LL semantics, on the other hand, is more interested in the logical aspects of se-
mantic representations, e.g. in the problem of formally specifying the appropriate
semantic representations of NL expressions. Appropriateness is here usually un-
derstood as correctly capturing the truth conditions of an expression.
In Section 3.1 we will argue for a distinction between the interpretation task
and the representation task. Whereas AI semantics tend to focus on the interpre-
tation task, LL semantics focus on the representation task. Since we think that the
domain model in VERBMOBIL will be used mainly for the interpretation task, we
opt for an approach more in the spirit of AI semantics. In contrast to many of the
representation formats used in AI semantics, however, we use a Description Logic
system (see Section 6.1) which combines the formal foundations of LL semantics
with computational requirements.
5Let us now turn our attention towards the dichotomy between theory-oriented
and application-oriented research. Usually, theory-oriented research starts with
defining the boundaries of its research—which aspects are to be accounted for and
which aspects will not be addressed. Obviously, this definition of the object of re-
search is itself influenced by the particular theory chosen (see [Kuhn 62]). Mostly,
theory-oriented research analyzes a well-defined subject in depth, e.g. individual
words of a language, specific constructions, etc.
Application-oriented research, on the other hand, cannot define the object of
research itself, but rather has to deal with the phenomena relevant in the respec-
tive application. Thus when building NLP systems for some application it is more
important to somehow cover all phenomena occurring in the application, then to
cover few phenomena in detail.
Given these differences in methodology and objective, there is sometimes the
tendency in both “fields” to disqualify research from the other field. Thus appli-
cation-oriented researchers complain about the irrelevance of theory-oriented re-
search for practical purposes, while theory-oriented researchers discard applica-
tion-oriented research as ad hoc and criticize the lack of theoretical foundation.
It should be obvious, however, that both research strategies should comple-
ment each other. Applications can be a good opportunity to evaluate theories, and
theories can provide sound foundations for applications. The problem is then to
find the right “balance” between theory-oriented and application-oriented activ-
ities. We think that as far as the VERBMOBIL demonstrator is concerned, our re-
search has to be application oriented. In Section 3 we will therefore develop some
application-oriented requirements for domain modeling, taking into account the
theoretical foundations in the field of formal semantics. Before doing so, however,
we will briefly sketch the overall architecture of the VERBMOBIL demonstrator in
so far as it is relevant for the task of domain modeling.
2 The Architecture of the VERBMOBIL Demon-
strator
For the VERBMOBIL demonstrator a more or less sequential architecture is
envisaged. In the context of this paper the modules Syntax, Lexicon, Semantic
Construction, Semantic Evaluation, and Dialogue are relevant. In the following
Note that this section is meant only as a description of the chosen architecture. We neither
intend to defend nor to criticize this choice in the following.
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Figure 1: Simplified architecture of the VERBMOBIL demonstrator from the
domain-modeling perspective.
7we will briefly sketch the functionality of these modules and their relationship to
the domain model (see also the architecture depicted in Figure 1).
Since VERBMOBIL is a speech-to-speech translation system, the input to the
syntactic parser is not a sequence of words, as in text-based NLP systems, but
rather a word lattice. Each path in this lattice is a sequence of words as analyzed
by the speech recognizer. The syntactic parser then builds syntactic structures for
some of these paths, eliminating other paths as being syntactically inconsistent.
A rather important aspect of this speech-based scenario is thus that the input
to the parser is already highly ambiguous. To obtain an efficient performance of
the overall system it is therefore crucial to eliminate “inconsistent” structures as
early as possible. In addition to purely syntactic information the parser takes into
account also semantic information in the form of selectional restrictions and se-
mantic sorts.
Consequently, the lexical entries contain information about semantic sorts as-
signed to the lexemes, as well as syntactic and semantic selectional restrictions for
the arguments they can take. To provide a sort hierarchy, i.e. a set of semantic sorts
and functionality to test sort compatibility, subsumption, or disjointness is thus one
of the tasks of the domain model in VERBMOBIL (see Section 4.1).
The output of Syntax are HPSG-style phrase structure trees, possibly alternative
ones whenever alternative paths in the word lattice are syntactically consistent, or
whenever one path is syntactically ambiguous. Semantic Construction takes these
phrase structure trees and builds up semantic representations in the format of Dis-
course Representation Structures (DRSs). These representations contain discourse
referents for the referring expressions and conditions capturing the semantic con-
tent of the utterance. Conditions are basically predicative propositions, where the
predicate is a semantic predicate obtained from the NL expression and the argu-
ments are discourse referents. Again, selectional restrictions of semantic predi-
cates to their arguments and sort information about discourse referents are used to
eliminate “inconsistent” structures.
The information contained in the DRS’s is used as input for Transfer. If Trans-
fer cannot determine an English translation on the basis of this information, Se-
mantic Evaluation further disambiguates the semantic representation. The basic
idea of this architecture is to allow a variable depth of analysis, i.e. a transfer-
guided disambiguation strategy. Thus ambiguities arising from the specific trans-
lation pair German/English do not influence Semantic Construction but are treated
It is not yet clear whether the choice of particular English lexemes is performed by Transfer
or by Generation.
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by Semantic Evaluation on demand by Transfer. Furthermore, Semantic Evalua-
tion can perform non-compositional and non-monotonic operations, e.g. type shift-
ing or coercion (see below), whereas Semantic Construction proceeds mostly com-
positionally and monotonically.
In addition to the sort hierarchy the domain model is thus supposed to provide a
conceptual hierarchy reflecting the semantic difference between German and En-
glish. These concepts are related to German and to English expressions bym-to-n
mappings. Roughly speaking, we will, for example, introduce n concepts for a
German lexeme if this lexeme can be translated into n English lexemes (see Sec-
tion 4.2 for more details).
Note that the sort hierarchy is supposed to be a subset of the conceptual hierar-
chy, namely its upper structure. The idea behind this architecture is that only very
general sort information is used in Syntax and Semantic Construction, whereas
more fine-grained conceptual information is used by Semantic Evaluation and
Transfer.
Since VERBMOBIL is supposed to translate utterances from dialogues, deter-
mining the communicative functions of expressions is crucial for their translation.
The module Dialogue provides relevant information about the dialogue context
and Semantic Evaluation computes the speech-event type of utterances (see Sec-
tion 4.3).
3 Semantics in VERBMOBIL
In the preceding section we have already indicated some of the tasks for which
the domain model is to be used. It should have become obvious that the informa-
tion contained in the domain model is intimately related to semantic information
in general. In particular the relationship between lexical semantics and the domain
model has to be clarified.
In this section we will consider the place of semantics in the VERBMOBIL
project and present our own perspective, which has major impact on our design of
the domain model. We will basically argue for a distinction between an interpreta-
tion and a representation task, and claim that there is a tendency for AI semantics
to focus on the interpretation task, whereas LL semantics tend to focus on the rep-
resentation task. Given this distinction we show which interpretation-related and
representation-related requirements to domain modeling arise in the VERBMOBIL
context.
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3.1 The Task of Semantics
In this section we will first address some fundamental semantic issues, namely the
problem of “aboutness”, the relationship between entailment and derivability, the
distinction between representation and intepretation, and the role of semantics in
Machine Translation in general and in VERBMOBIL in particular.
Semantics and Aboutness
We start this section by briefly sketching the view of semantics usually taken
in LL semantics, namely truth-conditional semantics. The basic idea of truth-
conditional semantics is that the meaning of a sentence can be identified with its
truth-conditions—to know what a sentence means, to understand a sentence is to
know under what conditions the sentence is true (see [Davidson 67, p. 23f]).
Usually this approach to meaning is accompanied by a correspondence theory
of truth a` la Tarski: “Die Wahrheit einer Aussage besteht in ihrer ¨Ubereinstimmung
(oder Korrespondenz) mit der Wirklichkeit” [Tarski 44, p. 143]. This leads propo-
nents of truth-conditional semantics to statements like the following:
We merely wish to emphasize that truth-conditional semantics, in con-
trast to the other approaches mentioned, is based squarely on the as-
sumption that the proper business of semantics is to specify how lan-
guage connects with the world – in other words, to explicate the in-
herent “aboutness” of language.
(...) in truth-conditional semantics we answer a question of the form
“What is the meaning of a sentence S?” by providing some sort of de-
scription of how things would have to be arranged in some relevant
corner of the world in order for S to be true. [Dowty et al. 81, p. 5]
Note that the matter of aboutness is relevant to us for two reasons:
1. For one thing, AI semantics have been criticized for not establishing about-
ness, e.g. Lewis’ critique against markerese in [Lewis 72], Fodor’s critique
of procedural semantics [Fodor 78], or Searle’s Chinese Room Gedanken-
experiment [Searle 80].
2. Secondly, LL semanticians usually claim to establish aboutness by us-
ing model-theoretic semantics, as illustrated by the above quotation from
[Dowty et al. 81]. Similar claims can be found in [Lewis 72], [Cresswell 78],
or [Kamp, Reyle 93].
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We think that both arguments are unjustified: neither does a model-theoretic se-
mantics establish aboutness, nor is the failure to establish aboutness a shortcoming
of semantic theories (neither of AI semantics nor of semantic theories in general).
We will briefly sketch the arguments for this position in the following. A more
detailed argument can be found in [Quantz 95, Chap. 2.4].
Usually, LL semantics “establish” the connection between language and world
by a model-theoretic semantics. Such a semantics defines formal criteria to decide
whether a given sentence is true or false in a given model. What seems to be over-
looked sometimes is that:
1. the important point of model-theoretic semantics is the definition of an en-
tailment relation, i.e. models are only a means to define entailment;
2. models are formal systems and not the world, i.e. they are as “far away” from
the real world as the sentences of a language.
Let us briefly explain these two points and their consequences. Clinging to the
aboutness metaphor, (1) means that it is not necessary for semantics to establish
aboutness and (2) that model theory is not sufficient to establish aboutness.
We begin by considering the claim that model-theoretic semantics establish
aboutness. Kamp and Reyle, for example, criticize semantic theories based on
mental representations for their failure to really explain meaning:
Indeed, explaining natural language solely by referring to mental rep-
resentations would only shift the problem of meaning to another lan-
guage. [Kamp, Reyle 93, p. 10]
They claim that model-theoretic semantic, on the other hand, relate natural lan-
guage to the real world and therefore explain meaning. This argument relies on the
assumption that the models underlying the model-theoretic semantics are some-
how closer to reality than natural languages or mental representations, a position
we find hard to accept. As Potts points out:
Model theory is, rather, an exercise in translation. (...)
Thus it is just a confusion to suppose that model theory can say any-
thing about the relation of language to the world; it can, at best, only
elucidate one language by reference to another. [Potts 75, p. 248]
Obviously, a model is just a representation, i.e. an element of a formal sign sys-
tem and therefore as different from “reality” as Natural Language expressions or
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mental representations. In particular, the assumption that the world is ultimately
a collection of predicates and constants standing in instanceship relations, reflects
the philosophical state-of-the-art of Logical Positivism, a research paradigm more
or less abandoned in recent philosophical development. The philosophy of inter-
nal realism, e.g. [Goodman 68, Goodman 78, Putnam 87] stresses the fact that the
structure of reality depends on the sign systems we use to perceive and describe it.
Therefore aboutness can only mean mapping from one sign system into another
and all our explanations will never leave the level of sign systems and reach an
independently existing reality.
We therefore reject arguments criticizing the failure of semantic theories to
establish aboutness, such as the ones cited above or given in [Fodor 78] or
[Searle 80]. Expecting a semantic theory to provide a connection between lan-
guage and world is ultimately as self-destructive as the doctrine of skepticism.
Note that both positions take an independently existing world for granted and then
complain that our knowledge/semantics fails to reach this world. But we have to
reject the inconsistent notion of a world completely independent from us, and ac-
knowledge the fact that a world is always given to us via signs and is ultimately
only experienced and understood through signs. Then the position that semantics
does not reach out of the level of signs but rests inside, i.e., is from a certain point
of view only syntax, is perfectly acceptable and not defective in any way.
The major contribution of model-theoretic semantics is therefore not to es-
tablish aboutness, but rather to provide a formal definition of an entailment re-
lation. In fact, there are alternative ways of defining such entailment relations,
e.g. [Leblanc 83] and though model theory is an especially fruitful framework for
studying formal properties, it is in a way inessential. Note that similar arguments
against the relevance of aboutness for semantics can already be found in [Mor-
ris 38, p. 58f] and [Wittgenstein 56, 293].
Entailment and Derivability
Summarizing the above considerations, the main contribution of LL semantics is
to provide a formal entailment relation on (sets of) semantic representations. We
will now address two important aspects of such an entailment relation:
1. the information relevant for entailment;
The world is, so to speak, not a Herbrand universe.
Putnam shows, for example, by using the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem, that a model-theoretic
semantics does not unambiguouslydetermine the denotations of the expressions of a language [Put-
nam 80].
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2. the relevance of the entailment relation for computational systems.
Let us first take a closer look at the nature of the entailment relation. Given a se-
mantic representation ‘m’ of an NL sentence, what formulae are entailed by it? It is
obvious that some formulae are entailed by ‘m’ alone, whereas others are entailed
by ‘m’ together with additional information. A simple example might illustrate
this:
(1) a. Bill has a brother and a sister.
b.  xBrother(bill,x)  ySister(bill,y)
We can derive from (b) alone that Bill has a brother, due to the semantics of the
logical connective . In order to derive the fact that Bill has two siblings we need
additional information, namely that brothers are male, that sisters are female, and
that the sets of males and females are disjoint.
There has been a slight tendency in LL semantics to concentrate on the first
type of entailments, i.e. on structural semantics, and to neglect the second type of
entailment, i.e. lexical semantics:
But we should not expect a semantic theory to furnish an account of
how any two expressions belonging to the same syntactic category dif-
fer in meaning. ‘Walk’ and ‘run’, for instance, and ‘unicorn’ and ‘ze-
bra’ certainly do differ in meaning, and we require a dictionary of En-
glish to tell us how. But the making of a dictionary demands consid-
erable knowledge of the world.. (...) These are matters of application,
not of theory. [Thomason 74, p.48f]
Obviously, lexical semantics is crucial for any theory of meaning interested in
modeling or explaining understanding, and this has been stressed by other re-
searchers in LL semantics, e.g. [Partee 80, Pinkal 85]. Nevertheless, Thomason’s
remark is not entirely unjustified and one way of dealing with the underlying prob-
lem is to distinguish between linguistic meaning and encyclopedic meaning. The
idea is to separate the information related to expressions into linguistic and non-
linguistic information. In a sense this distinction corresponds to the philsophical
distinction between analytic and synthetic knowledge and thus inherits the short-
comings of this distinction [Quine 51]. We will not address this issue any further,
but the following two points seem fundamental to us:
Note that via the Gricean Maximes we can also infer that Bill has not more than two siblings
[Levinson 83].
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1. Given a sentence (or its formal semantic representation), inferences can in-
volve various, “arbitrary” pieces of information.
2. The semantic information used to draw inferences cannot be easily and un-
controversially divided into linguistic and non-linguistic information. If
there is a borderline between linguistic and non-linguistic semantic infor-
mation at all, it is fuzzy.
The first point implies that the more one knows, the more a sentence means to one
(the more inferences one can draw). We will now sketch the consequences of this
for computational semantics in general and for VERBMOBIL in particular.
In the preceding paragraphs we have used terms like ‘to draw inferences’. We
still have to explain the relationship between such a term and the notion of seman-
tic entailment. In fact this is to explain the relevance of entailment relations for
computational systems, a task we have mentioned above but not addressed so far.
Given an entailment relation  j  , one can define a deduction system based
on a purely syntactic relation of derivability (  ). These inference systems can
then be evaluated with respect to the semantics: an inference system is sound and
complete iff j       (see [Sundholm 83] for details). Thus from a system-
oriented point of view, the entailment relation is just an “ideal”, whereas the deriv-
ability relation is the “reality”. This is particularly important if systems provide
only incomplete algorithms. Note that incomplete algorithms are necessary if com-
puting entailment is undecidable or intractable [Garey, Johnson 79], and (efficient)
termination has to be guaranteed, as is the case in real-world applications.
Summarizing the above discussion about formal semantics, we can distinguish
a theoretical point of view and a system-oriented point of view. Whereas a seman-
tic entailment is a good basis for developing inference systems and is highly use-
ful for theoretical investigations, it is on its own useless from a system-oriented
point of view. Given a system, the meaning of a semantic representation ‘m’ for
the system is characterized by the representations ‘n’ derivable from ‘m’. What is
important to note is thus that:
1. the meaning of a representation ‘m’ for a system is not determined by
(a) ‘m’ alone;
(b) a model-theoretic interpretation of ‘m’;
The importance of deduction is also stressed in [Benthem 81] and [Galton 88].
This is also one of the differences between simplified artificial scenarios and realistic applica-
tions pointed out in [Wahlster 94].
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2. but instead by ‘m’ together with
(a) the information stored by the system;
(b) the inference algorithms implemented in the system
In other words, a formal representation xP x Qx is for a system no more
meaningful than ‘foo’ if it has no inference rules for dealing with  P and Q.
Semantics in Machine Translation
So far we have sketched the task of semantics in NLP systems in general, with-
out addressing the particular requirements in Machine Translation. Let us start by
sketching a “naive” approach to MT in order to illustrate some relevant aspects.
Such an approach can be characterized as follows:
1. Analyze the source-language expression and derive its meaning, i.e. a se-
mantic representation.
2. Generate a target-language expression from this semantic representation, i.e.
an expression expressing the same meaning as the source-language expres-
sion.
Note that this approach offers a lot of desirable advantages. The semantic repre-
sentation functions as an interlingua, i.e. having an analyzer for German and a gen-
erator for English, one would “only” have to write an analyzer (or a generator) for
Japanese in order to achieve Japanese/English (German/Japanese) translation.
Furthermore, this approach seems to capture the common-sense understanding
that the meaning of an expression is the thing to be conserved in translation, i.e. is
the equivalent of translation. Though theoretically attractive, this approach faces
a number of problems, especially in connection with a truth-conditional approach
to semantics:
1. there are still many unresolved issues in truth-conditional semantics, e.g.
(a) a truth-conditional semantics of non-declarative sentences, which are
crucial in the dialogue-oriented VERBMOBIL scenario, is still frag-
mentary;
(b) as we will see below, truth conditions ultimately depend on lexical se-
mantics and have to include encyclopedic knowledge;
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(c) tautologies have identical truth-conditions, thus ‘2 + 2 = 4’ would have
the same meaning as, for example, ‘3 + 3 = 6’;
2. in general, truth-conditions are not the only equivalent of translation; in the
VERBMOBIL demonstrator scenario it seems much more appropriate to rely
on the communicative function of an utterance as the most important equiv-
alent of translation;
3. there are numerous occurrences of idiomatic expressions, for which a truth-
conditional semantics is not appropriate;
4. the approach basically relies on the mapping relations e
SL
 m and m 
e
TL
and does not “really” access the truth conditions.
Thus truth-conditional semantics seems to be neither sufficient nor necessary for
MT.
Given the scenario for the VERBMOBIL demonstrator, it has been argued
elsewhere [Schmitz 94] that the communicative function of an utterance, i.e. the
speech-event type it realizes is in most cases the adequate equivalent of transla-
tion. Depending on the particular speech-event type, the semantic content is more
or less important. For example, the date described in a proposal (‘vorschlag’) is
crucial, whereas uttereances like
(2) Wie sieht es da bei Ihnen aus?
do not contribute much semantic content but are rather idiomatic realizations
of certain communicative functions, e.g. ‘aufforderung stellungnahme’ (see also
Section 4.3).
The argumentation so far can be summarized as follows:
1. it is not clear to which degree a system has to understand an utterance in or-
der to translate it. There are cases where “deep understanding” seems nec-
essary, as well as cases where translation is possible without such a “deep
understanding”.
2. it is therefore not clear to which degree a semantic representation of an ut-
terance has to be constructed, more precisely, how accurate a semantic rep-
resentation has to reflect the full semantic content of an utterance.
In the following, we will argue that the degree of semantic representation should
be largely determined by requirements arising from the interpretation task.
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Representation and Interpretation
The distinction between the representation task and the interpretation task can best
be explained by considering a sequential architecture for NLP in which different
formalisms are used to represent information on different levels (as is the case in
the VERBMOBIL demonstrator). Given such a multi-level approach the represen-
tation problem is to represent the different interpretations possible at a given level
and the interpretation problem is to produce the appropriate representations at each
level from the input to that level [Allen 87, p. 9].	
It should be noted that first, the representation task cannot be adequately spec-
ified without taking into account the particular application for which the represen-
tation is to be used; and that second, the interpretation task depends on the cho-
sen representation format—more precisely, whether a representation on a specific
level is ambiguous depends on the representation format chosen for the subsequent
level. Though both tasks are thus intimately related, it is useful to distinguish them.
One might even conceive an NLP system in which the interpretation task is only
guided by the system but has to be performed by a human user. An interactive MT
system could ask the user to provide the information it needs to translate an expres-
sion into the target language; an interactive text archiving system could ask the user
to provide the information it needs to appropriately classify a given NL text. For
the design of such systems the representation task would be predominant, whereas
the interpretation task could be neglected. 

Given this distinction, we think that in Machine Translation in general, and in
the VERBMOBIL demonstrator in particular, semantics is mainly needed to sup-
port the interpretation task. Though semantic representation is used as an input
for Transfer and Generation, there is no need to use it immediately for drawing in-
ferences. Contrast this with Information Systems, in which the semantic content of
a query has to be evaluated wrt the stored information; or with text understanding
systems in which the information contained in a text has to be represented seman-
tically in order to answer queries.  
	Note that a similar distinction can be made for NLP systems using a homogeneous represen-
tation of these levels, e.g. the sign structure in HPSG. Here the different levels are represented via
different features in the sign structure.
 
See, for example, Kay’s ideas on the Negotiator architecture [Kay et al. 91].
  In Section 5 we will see that domain models or ontologies are used differently in different sys-
tems. Some are used only for the interpretation task or the representation task, some are used for
both tasks.
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Figure 2: A simple ISA hierarchy.
Semantics in VERBMOBIL
Thus we see the main task of semantics in the VERBMOBIL project not in providing
an interlingua-like representation for translation, but rather in supporting the inter-
pretation process, i.e. the disambiguation steps necessary in transforming German
expressions into English expressions.
Note that such a view implies the following methodology:
1. identify the interpretation processes in VERBMOBIL, i.e. the transitions from
one representation format to another which require disambiguation;
2. identify the semantic information needed to perform these disambiguations;
3. model this semantic information.
Instead of thus modeling semantic information in general, which would necessitate
arbitrary decisions what to model and what to leave out, this approach provides
us with a criterion to decide whether a piece of information should be included
in the domain model or not. In Section 6 we will sketch four different tasks and
their support by the domain model. Before doing so, however, we will address two
general points, namely the function of conceptual hierarchies and the problem of
polysemy and type shifting.
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3.2 Conceptual Hierarchies
Conceptual hierarchies are the most obvious way to represent semantic informa-
tion needed in the interpretation task. A simple ISA hierarchy, as shown in Figure 2
allows type checking and inheritance. We will briefly address six issues in the fol-
lowing:
1. the function of conceptual hierarchies;
2. the distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic semantic information;
3. the complexity of conceptual hierarchies;
4. the “distinction” between upper model and domain model;
5. the connection between conceptual hierarchies and LL semantics;
6. the status of conceptual hierarchies wrt NL expressions.
First, conceptual hierarchies are based on the intuition that some of our common-
sense knowledge is hierarchically structured, a notion underlying representation
formats as Semantic Nets [Quillian 68] or Frames [Minsky 75]. The main advan-
tage of a hierarchical structure is that information can be inherited from general
concepts to specific ones, and thus allows compact modeling and storage of infor-
mation. For example, the fact that dogs bark can be inherited from the concept
‘dog’ to the more specific concept ‘collie’.
It should be noted that conceptual hierarchies are used similarly within a
new Machine Translation paradigm, namely Example-Based Machine Translation.
Here conceptual hierarchies called thesauri are used to determine the semantic dif-
ference between the phrase to be translated and the stored examples translations,
e.g. [Almuallim et al. 94].
Second, it should be noted that conceptual hierarchies can contain linguistic,
as well as non-linguistic semantic information. As mentioned above in Section 3.1
we do not think that a clear-cut distinction between these types of information is
possible (this will be illustrated when discussing literal meaning and polysemy be-
low). Since we do not see any advantage of making such a distinction in the VERB-
MOBIL context anyway, we will not refer to it any further in the following.
Third, conceptual hierarchies can be more complex than simple ISA hierar-
chies. Semantic Nets, Frames, and Description Logics allow to specify “horizon-
tal” links between concepts, e.g. expressing that events occur at a particular loca-
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tion and time. Using more complex hierarchies makes reasoning a lot more com-
plex as well, and many NLP systems use only simple hierarchies in the interpreta-
tion process.
Fourth, a distinction is sometimes made between an upper model and the do-
main model. This distinction, which is rather popular in the literature on domain
modeling, has been suggested in [Mann 85, Bateman 92] and realized in PEN-
MAN, a text-generation project. It should be noted that the distinction is based on
theoretical assumptions which might not be straightforwardly applicable to NLP
in general. Basically, the PENMAN Upper Model reflects abstract semantic dis-
tinctions needed to categorize the propositional content of a text. In the framework
underlying the PENMAN system, namely systemic-functional linguistics, this as-
pect of meaning is called ideational meaning [Halliday 70].
There are different views on the distinction between upper model and domain
model. From a system-oriented point of view there is a rather pragmatic reason for
the distinction—the upper model is provided by PENMAN, whereas the domain
model has to be defined by the user, basically by refining the upper model. Thus the
upper model contains all relevant aspects of actions and relations and inherits them
to the domain model. In [Bateman 92] the upper model is motivated as an interface
between linguistic and conceptual knowledge. For the VERBMOBIL demonstrator
scenario we prefer a direct mapping from NL expressions into concepts and do not
see the necessity of an additional interface level.
A comparison of the ontologies and the domain models used in existing NLP
systems, as the ones sketched above, shows that they differ considerably wrt the
basic categories they use (see Section 5). We think that these differences stem
mainly from the fact that the respective models are used for rather different tasks
(e.g. text understanding, translation, disambiguation, generation).
In the following we will not make a distinction between an upper model and a
domain model. We will, however, distinguish a subset of the conceptual hierarchy.
This subset, which we will refer to as the sort hierarchy, will be used by Syntax
and Semantic Construction and contains rather general semantic categories (see
Section 6.2). We do not use the term ‘upper model’ for it in order to avoid the
connotations of this term stemming from the work in the PENMAN context.
Fifth, it should be noted that conceptual hierarchies in fact realize a sort of
lexical semantics. Thus having an ISA relation between P and Q means logically
xP x  Qx. A conceptual hierarchy can thus be seen as a list of meaning
postulates [Dowty et al. 81] or constraints [Barwise 89]. Two things should be
noted, however:
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1. the ISA relations hold between concepts and not between lexemes or expres-
sions of a natural language;
2. the ISA relations contain only part of the semantic potential of a concept,
i.e. they do not contain analytic definitions. The amount of information con-
tained in a conceptual hierarchy depends on the requirements of the task for
which it is needed.
The first remark leads us to the relationship between the concepts in a conceptual
hierarchy and the lexemes/expressions of a natural language. This is a rather im-
portant issue and is, in a way, the overture to the problem of polysemy and type
shifting discussed in the next section.
It is common practice in lexical semantics to define semantic relations on lex-
emes and NL expressions, e.g. [Cruse 86, Chap. 4]. It should be noted, however,
that these definitions are ultimately based on the meanings of the expressions, and
that the corresponding tests of truth conditions have to be defined rather carefully
in order to avoid contextual effects (e.g. Cruse’s definition of hyponomy [Cruse 86,
p. 88f]).
Let us take a closer look at this problem by considering a concrete example.
Suppose you are modeling a conceptual hierarchy and have to decide where to in-
sert the concept expressed by the German lexeme ‘Abendessen’ (dinner). It be-
comes immediately obvious that there are a number of options, comprising, for
example:
 ‘Abendessen’ as a specialization of FOOD;
 ‘Abendessen’ as a specialization of EVENT.
This “problem” has been discussed in different contexts in the literature, most often
in connection with polysemy or type shifting. In the next section we will address
this phenomenon in detail.
3.3 Polysemy and Type Shifting
In order to discuss the problem of polysemy and type shifting we need to briefly
sketch a general framework of semantic interpretation and representation. We will
distinguish two main tasks of semantic interpretation, namely the determination of
1. the conceptual content and
3.3 Polysemy and Type Shifting 21
2. the referent
of an expression. This distinction, which roughly correponds to the distinction be-
tween denotation and reference, is sometimes obscured in existing semantic the-
ories (see [Lyons 77, 7.2] and [Lyons 91, p. 10f]). Strictly speaking it is not an
expression which refers, but rather the speaker by using that expression. As a con-
sequence, expressions have reference only in so far as they are text-expressions,
but not as system-expressions per se.  Thus it does not make any sense to speak
of the reference of system-expressions like ‘the president’, ‘documents’, ‘she’, or
‘office’.
Nonetheless it is perfectly sensible to speak of the meanings of such system-
expressions. Given a denotational approach to semantics, we might say, for ex-
ample, that ‘president’ denotes the class of all presidents, ‘office’ the classs of all
offices, etc. Note that one could try to reduce denotation to reference by saying
that the denotation of a lexeme ‘l’ contains all the objects to which a speaker can
refer by using the expression ‘this l’. According to this view a referring expres-
sion has a denotation, which is determined by its linguistic form, and it refers to a
particular member of this denotation when used in a particular context (cf, for ex-
ample, the distinction between meaning and interpretation in situation semantics
[Barwise, Perry 83, p. 36f]).
In the following we will discuss tow main problems arising in connection with
such an approach:
1. Given an expression, how can we determine its conceptual content (denota-
tion)?
2. What exactly is the relationship between the conceptual content of an ex-
pression and its referent?
The first problem is related to the problem of literal meaning and polysemy, the
second one to the problem of type shifting or coercion.
Literal Meaning and Polysemy
In the following we will assume that the conceptual content of a referring expres-
sion is a concept and that its referent is an object (thus using DL terminology as
sketched in Section 6.1). We will not address the question of what exactly a con-
cept is, however. For the purpose of our argumentation it suffices to assume that a
 See [Lyons 77, p. 31] and [Brown, Yule 83, Sect. 1.3] for this distinction.
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concept can be more specific than, equivalent to, or disjoint from another concept,
and that objects are instances of concepts. This can be formalized in First-Order
Predicate Logic or in Description Logics, but we do not think that this particular
formalization is essential for our discussion.
Given the dominance of truth-conditional semantics in the last decades, it is
not suprising that many approaches to lexical meaning rely on the truth-condition-
testing method. Consider, for example, the definition of cognitive synonymy in
[Cruse 86, p. 88]:
X is a cognitive synonym of Y, if (i) X and Y are syntactically identi-
cal, and (ii) any grammatical declarative sentence S containing X has
equivalent truth-conditions to another sentence S’, which is identical
to S except that X is replaced by Y.
Though we think that this is a useful test criterion for synonymy it is not a real defi-
nition since it reduces synonymy of lexemes to equivalence of truth conditions, i.e.
to analyticity (see [Quine 51, p. 28ff]). In fact recourse to truth conditions does not
help us much in modeling conceptual contents, because if we are uncertain about
the exact meaning of an expression we will not be able to specify the exact truth
conditions of a sentence containing it.
To illustrate the problem, consider some of the examples discussed in the lit-
erature. Bosch discusses the truth conditions of
(3) There will be coffee in the lounge at 10.30.
in [Bosch 85]. He claims that this sentence would be true if
1. there were a coffee break at 10.30;
2. there were a bag of coffee beans on one of the tables in the lounge;
3. there were coffee powder spilled on the carpet;
4. etc.
This example illustrates several points already mentioned in previous sections. For
one thing, truth conditions, if understood as in Bosch’s example, do not reflect our
ability of understanding completely. “Our understanding of utterances in ordinary
circumstances is almost always more specific than the truth conditions of the sen-
tence uttered” [Bosch 85, p. 251].
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Second, instead of assigning a single conceptual content to each expression, it
seems more reasonable to say that an expression as a system-expression is ambigu-
ous since it can express several different conceptual contents. Only in a particular
context, i.e. given the expression as a text-expression, is a particular conceptual
content activated. Thus we can list the concepts COFFEE DRINK, COFFEE BEANS,
COFFEE POWDER, COFFEE BREAK, COFFEE PLANT, etc. as possible conceptual
contents of the lexeme ‘coffee’.  Doing so has the advantage that each of these
concepts can be classified at an appropriate place in the conceptual hierarchy, e.g.
COFFEE DRINK below DRINK, COFFEE BREAK below EVENT, etc. 
But we immediately face another problem—how do we decide how many con-
ceptual contents we have to assign to an expression? Again, consider an example
taken from the literature, namely the meaning of the lexeme ‘open’ discussed in
[Searle 83, p. 145]: 
(4) a. Tom opened the door.
b. Sally opened her eyes.
c. The carpenters opened the wall.
d. Sam opened his book on page 37.
e. The surgeon opened the wound.
Searle claims that
... the word “open” has the same literal meaning in all five of these
occurrences. Anyone who denied this would soon be forced to hold
the view that the word “open” is indefinitely or perhaps even infinitely
ambiguous since we can continue the example; and indefinite ambigu-
ity seems an absurd result. [Searle 83, p. 146]
He gives additional examples in which one might argue that the lexeme ‘open’ has
a different meaning:
 Note that one problem in conceptual modeling is to find appropriate identifiers for the concepts.
Though we think that this is a rather important issue, especially wrt useability of a modeling, we
will not pursue it any further in this report.
 One consequence of this approach is that truth conditions are underdetermined by sentences.
Truth conditions are only determined given a particular choice of the conceptual contents of the
expressions occurring in the sentences (see, for example, [Pinkal 85, p. 12ff] or [Bosch 85, p. 251]).
 Bosch discusses the same problem and lists the 29 senses of ‘open’ in Collins Cobuild English
Language Dictionary [Bosch 93].
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SL−expression 1
SL−expression 2
TL−expression 1concept 1
TL−expression 2concept 2
TL−expression 3concept 3
Figure 3: NL expressions and concepts are related by m-to-n mappings.
(5) a. The chairman opened the meeting.
b. The artillery opened fire.
c. Bill opened a restaurant.
Searle uses these examples to show that understanding requires a preintentional
Background and that the literal meaning of a sentence is thus not a context-free
notion, but is relative to a set of preintentional Background assumptions and prac-
tices [Searle 83, p. 145f].
For our argumentation it is important to note that these examples show how
linguistic meaning and encyclopedic information are intertwined. Only given our
knowledge about the typical events described in the sentences do we understand
the word ‘open’. How could we divide this knowledge into a linguistic-meaning
part and a world-knowledge part?
Let us summarize the discussion:
1. the conceptual content of expressions is context dependent;
2. it is problematic to decide how many concepts to assign to an expression
(truth-condition tests are helpful but do not resolve all problematic cases).
Since we are not primarily interested in truth conditions anyway, we propose to
base the assignment of concepts to expressions on the requirements of our partic-
ular application, namely translation form German into English.
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Transfer-Oriented Conceptual Modeling
A straightforward criterion for deciding how many conceptual contents to assign
to a source-language expression is to provide a separate concept for each possi-
ble target-language translation. Consider the examples (4) and (5)—the German
translation for ‘open’ in (4) is ‘o¨ffnen’, whereas in (5) it is ‘ero¨ffnen’. This would
be a reason to distinguish the conceptual content of ‘open’ expressed in (4) and
(5). In general, we would thus have m-to-n mappings between NL expressions
and concepts, as illustrated in Figure 3.
Note that the structure of the conceptual hierarchy to be modeled thus depends
on the particular source and target languages. Based on contrastive analyses it can
be decided whether a concept has to be included into the domain model or not.
Note further, that it is in principle possible to extend such a bilingually motivated
hierarchy by adding new source and target languages, i.e. by adding mappings and
integrating the additionally required conceptual distinctions [Hovy, Nirenburg 92,
Henschel, Bateman 94].
Though the above criterion is a fundamental methodological principle under-
lying our domain modeling, it is not the only one. In adopting an m-to-n map-
ping from expressions into concepts we have to perform conceptual disambigua-
tion when processing utterances—when given a particular utterance, we have to
select a particular conceptual content form the various possible ones.
As already indicated in the above discussion, the choice of a particular con-
ceptual content is determined by the context in which an expression occurs. The
examples have also shown that this context involves complex background knowl-
edge. The major problem for conceptual disambiguation is
1. to make background knowledge available, i.e. to store it in the computer;
2. to provide fast access to backrground knowledge, i.e. to provide inference
mechanisms drawing the relevant inferences.
In the absence of a satisfying solution to this task which comprises our entire
common-sense knowledge one has to devise heuristics based on partial informa-
tion and incomplete reasoning. The most popular way of doing conceptual disam-
biguation is by means of selectional restrictions. Roughly speaking, conceptual
disambiguation is performed in this approach by considering the arguments of an
expression, or vice versa the functor taking an expression as argument. Note that
this is a rather limited way of taking context into account, but it is exactly this lim-
itation which makes it computationally feasible.
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For illustration consider again the examples (4) and (5). To distinguish be-
tween the two readings of ‘open’ we can check whether the argument of ‘open’
is a thing or an event. If it is a thing we map ‘open’ to the concept expressed by
‘o¨ffnen’, if it is an event we map it to the concept expressed by ‘ero¨ffnen’.
Having sketched the general approach we will now point out some of the prob-
lems arising in its application. Wrt design criteria ot should be kept in mind that
we will have to insert concepts into the hierarchy needed for expressing the selec-
tional restrictions. Thus we have two main criteria for deciding which conceptual
distinctions to include in the domain model:
1. distinctions due to different lexicalizations in German and English;
2. distinctions relevant for selectional restrictions used for conceptual disam-
biguation.
In Section 4.2 we will illustrate this in more detail by considering concrete exam-
ples from the VERBMOBIL demonstrator corpus.
Type Shifting
Let us take a closer look at the strategy for conceptual disambiguation sketched
above. The attentive reader may have noticed our rather informal description of
selectional restrictions, i.e. the phrase ‘whether the argument of ‘open’ is a thing
or an event’. Obviously, the argument of ‘open’ can be neither, but rather is a lin-
guistic expression. Thus it would be more accurate to test whether the referent of
the argument of ‘open’ is a thing or an event; or whether the conceptual content of
the argument of ‘open’ is subsumed by THING or by EVENT.
This might seem a little pedantic but there are in effect two serious issues in-
volved:
1. selectional restrictions should not be applied on the linguistic level, but
rather on the conceptual level;
2. we still have to explain the exact realtionsship between the conceptual con-
tent of an expression and its referent.
We begin with the second issue which will eventually lead us to the first issue.
In general it would seem that the conceptual content of an expression is a type
or a concept, and that its referent is a token or a particular individual, which is an
instance of the conceptual content. This conception underlies Nunberg’s excellent
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analysis of reference [Nunberg 78]. His first criticism concerns the fact that the
referent of an expression is not necessarily an instance of its conceptual content
(Nunberg uses the terms ‘designatum’ and ‘nominatum’). He lists a number of
examples, some of which have become quite famous, to show that complex func-
tions may be involved in order to determine the referent of an expression given
its conceptual content. He offers a rough disctinction between normal, local, and
metaphorical word-uses (p. 55).
(6) We had chicken for dinner last night. (p. 91, (1))
(7) The ham sandwich is waiting for his check. (p. 91, (10))
(8) That snake (John) would say anything to get elected (p. 91, (15))
The use of ‘chicken’ to refer to chicken meat is normal, since it can be rationally
used out of context. The use of ‘ham sandwich’ to refer to the person who or-
dered/ate a ham sandwich is rational only in that specific context and thus local.
Finally, the use of ‘snake’ is metaphorical in (8). Note that Nunberg “introduced
these categories only for the sake of convenienc. The boundaries between them
are rough” (p. 91).
What Nunberg’s examples show in any case is that words can be used to refer to
a wide range of objects. Given our framework of conceptual content and reference,
we are thus left with two options:
1. We can enlarge the range of conceptual contents associated with expressions.
Thus one possible conceptual content of ‘ham sandwich’ would be ‘person
who ordered/ate a ham sandwich’. We could then continue to say that the
referent of an expression is an instance of its conceptual content.
2. We can loosen the requirement that the referent of an expression is an in-
stance of its conceptual content and allow additional relations between ref-
erent and conceptual content (instantiation being the normal or preferred re-
lation).
Nunberg shows that similar patterns found with descriptive terms are mirrored in
ostension (Sect. 1.5). We can, for example, point to a newspaper and utter
(9) Hearst bought that.
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thereby using ‘that’ to refer to the newspaper company. We take this as evidence
for a theory which keeps the number of conceptual contents associated with an ex-
pression small and allows referents to be related to conceptual contents by other
means than instanceship.
Note that Nunberg’s criticism goes even further. If we can use words to refer to
such a wide range of objects, how do we determine the literal meaning of a word?
In other words, how do we know what the conceptual content of a word is, if we
cannot define it as the type of objects which can be referred to by using the word
(Sect. 3.2). Nunberg believes that this question can only be answered by taking
into account the “normal beliefs” of a speaker or a community (Sect. 4.1) and that
hence a purely semantic theory of meaning is not possible. This again shows that a
distinction between linguistic semantic knowledge and general world knowledge
is problematic. We will not pursue this issue here but we have to keep in mind that
we have no clear-cut method to decide how broad the range of conceptual contents
assigned to an expression should be. We can only base our decision on our intuition
concerning the distinction between normal and local uses.
Let us assume for the time being that in normal uses the referents of expressions
are instance of the respective conceptual contents, whereas in local and metaphor-
ical uses there will be complex functions between conceptual contents and refer-
ents. We will consider non-normal uses when discussing selectional restrictions
below. In the case of normal uses we have to decide how to model the various
conceptual contents of expressions adequately. Nunberg criticizes linguistic treat-
ments of polysemy according to which the various conceptual contents of a word
are explicitly listed in the lexicon, yielding multiple lexical entries for each word:
All these syntactic treatments of polysemy are subject to two related
criticisms: they complicate the grammar unnecessarily, and they are
unrevealing, giving us descriptions in place of explanations. (...)
There are several excellent reasons, however, for supposing that many
of the multiple uses of polysemous words don’t have to be listed, since
they would be generated by pragmatic schemata in any event (p. 13).
This idea has been taken up by several authors. The fundamental principle is to
provide a single conceptual content for an expression from which additional con-
ceptual contents can be generated. Note that this generation is triggered by the
context, for example if the “original” conceptual content does not satisfy the selec-
tional restrictions imposed by a functor. The process of substituting the “original”
conceptual content by a conceptual content consistent with the contextual require-
ments is called type shifting or type coercion. Formal meaning shifts motivated by
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the type-theoretic framework of Montague Grammar have been proposed in [Par-
tee 87, Partee 92]. In [Do¨lling 92] this approach is taken up and applied to domain-
specific shifting operations, e.g. from mass nouns to count nouns or from plurals to
singulars. Pustejovsky proposes to use qualia structures to control type coercion
[Pustejovsky 93a].
Having stated the problem in its general form, we will now analyze its rele-
vance in the VERBMOBIL context. Let us address normal uses first. Though we
agree that having a list of type shifting operations which generate conceptual con-
tents is highly desirable from a theoretical point of view, it is not indispensable
from a system-oriented point of view. In fact, considering performance require-
ments it might even be more efficient to explicitly store the alternative conceptual
contents of a lexeme than to generate them during run-time.
In any case, from the perspective of Domain Modeling and Semantic Evalua-
tion it does not make much difference whether the conceptual contents associated
with a lexeme are explicitly stored in the lexicon or generated by additional rules. 
In both cases the respective conceptual contents have to be represented in the con-
ceptual hierarchy, and methods for chosing the appropriate conceptual content in
a particular context have to be devised.
Note that the situation is different for more complex type shifts, especially as in
local or metaphorical uses. It seems that these cases cannot be handled with a small
list of type-shifting operations but require complex reasoning. We will briefly con-
sider the relevance of this phenomenon in the VERBMOBIL context. Reconsider
example (7)—at first glance, one might try to ignore this phenomeneon in the con-
text of Machine Translation for two reasons. First, one might argue, the example
is idosyncratic and presupposes a rather specific context. Second, the phrase ‘the
ham sandwich’ has to be translated into a corresponding target-language expres-
sion, and not into an expression corresponding to ‘the customer who ordered a ham
sandwich’, i.e. the type shift is irrelevant for translation.
Though both arguments contain important insights, they are unfortunately not
valid. Whereas the ham-sandwich example is in effect a rather extreme case of
type-shifting, less extreme cases occur more frequently than one might expect. In
the dialogues collected so far, we can distinguish, for example, at least three major
ways of using the noun ‘Termin’
event: in the sense of an appointment, meeting:
 The situation might be compared to the use of meta rules as, for example, used for passiviza-
tion. It should not make much difference to the syntactic parser whether passive verb forms are
epxlicitly stored in the lexicon or generated by meta rules.
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 einen Termin beim Zahnarzt haben
 den ganzen Tag hindurch Termine haben
 zu unserem Termin treffen
temporal: in the sense of a time point or a time interval:
 einen Termin frei haben
 den Termin freihalten
abstract: as a unit of information:
 den Termin notieren
 einen Termin vergessen
As regards the second argument, namely the irrelevance of type shifting for trans-
lation, we have already argued that translation does not always require deep un-
derstanding. But in this example the type shift has to be dealt with. As mentioned
above, the type shift is triggered by the verb phrase ‘is waiting for his check’. There
are at least three pieces of information indicating the shift: 
1. the predicate ‘is waiting’ cannot be applied to sandwiches;
2. the anaphor ‘his’ cannot refer to a sandwich (it would have to be ‘its’ in-
stead);
3. ‘its check’ with ‘its’ referring to sandwich is not meaningful.
The second point is, for example, crucial when translating the German sen-
tence
(10) Das Schinkenbrot wartet auf seine Rechnung.
into English. In order to translate ‘seine’ as ‘his’ and not as ‘its’ one has to know
that it refers to the customer not to the sandwich.
The information sketched in points (1) and (3) is usually encoded in form of
selectional restrictions to which we will turn our attention now.
 A fourth piece of information is the definite description ‘the ham sandwich’, where ‘the’ either
introduces a discourse object being so prominent in the discourse setting that just to move to that
setting “instantiates” this object as e.g. in “There is an election to parliament next month. The can-
didates have already .. .” or that the referent of the definite description has been already established
in a preceeding part of the discourse.
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Selectional Restrictions
The main problem of selectional restrictions is that they are often used on the lin-
guistic level, whereas their justification stems from the conceptual level. Above we
said that the predicate ‘is waiting’ cannot be applied to sandwiches and we regard
this as a conceptual constraint. More precisely, we might say that the lexeme ‘wait’
can express a concept INTENTIONAL WAIT, which requires intentional agents, i.e.
humans, institutions, and perhaps animals.
Note that this does not imply that the lexeme ‘wait’ can only be combined with
subjects referring to potential agents. One can, for example, say
(11) This work will have to wait until later.
A couple of remarks seem in order:
1. Should we say that the verb ‘to wait’ has the same conceptual content in (7)
and (11)?
2. If they do have the same conceptual content, what is the status of the selec-
tional restriction to intentional agents?
3. If they do not have the same conceptual content, what is the relationship be-
tween the two conceptual contents?
We think that there are arguments both for claiming that the conceptual content is
the same and for saying that it is different. According to our understanding, con-
cepts are used to classify “real-world entities” (e.g. objects or events), i.e. they are
general and constitute abstractions over particulars. NL expressions are then used
to convey these abstractions, and can even abstract further, i.e. the same expression
can be used to express different conceptual abstractions. Note that this is an exam-
ple of the efficiency of language as defined in [Barwise, Perry 83, p. 32ff].
Since we only have direct access to the linguistic level, and (more or less di-
rect) to the level of particulars, the conceptual level is highly underdetermined.
Thus, using the same word in (7) and (11) can be taken as evidence for the same
underlying concept. But taking a closer look at the particular events described,
one might also opt for two different concepts of ‘waiting’. As explained above,
we will mainly rely on contrastive analyses to decide this issue. If both the source
and the target language use the same word to express “two concepts”, we will iden-
tify these concepts and include only one concept in the domain model. This is the
main reason for calling our approach transfer-oriented domain modeling.
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There are still a number of open questions regarding the treatment of sentences
like (7). In particular, example (11) has shown that we cannot have a strict selec-
tional restriction requiring that the subjects of ‘two wait’ have to refer to intentional
agents. The sentence
(12) The ham sandwich is waiting for a customer.
is perfectly meaningful. Thus the type shift cannot be triggered by the verb ‘is
waiting’ alone. It seems to us that it is the verb phrase as a whole, which triggers
the type shift, especially the anaphoric pronoun ‘his’ in ‘waiting for his check’.
Thus it is complex world knowledge about checks, customers, ham sandwiches,
and friends which triggers the type shift in (7), blocks it in (12), and triggers it
in:
(13) The ham sandwich is waiting for a friend.
Note that a type-shifting reading, in a sense analoguous to (13), is also possible
in (12), and one might even cook up contexts which block type shifting in (7) and
(13). Roughly speaking one has to test all possible combinations of conceptual
contents for a functor andits argument to find out the consistent ones.
We draw the following conclusions from these considerations:
1. Selectional restrictions should be modeled on the conceptual level.
2. If selectional restrictions are used on the NL-expression level, they can only
have the status of preference rules, i.e. they behave like defaults and not like
strict constraints.
The main reason for using selectional restrictions on the NL-expression level are
1. to speed up the performance, i.e. to allow disambiguation without recourse
to complex semantic analysis;
2. to cope with partial information, i.e. to allow disambiguation in the absence
of complex common-sense knowledge.
In the next section we will show in detail how information from the domain model
in general and selectional restrictions in particular are to be used in VERBMOBIL. It
should be noted that the modeling of selectional restrictions, as the domain model
in general, is largely determined by the specific requirements of the interpretation
tasks and not by general semantic considerations.
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In this section we describe the different uses of the domain model within VERB-
MOBIL. So far we see four main tasks which are supported by the domain model:
1. sortal information and selectional restrictions are used in the parsing process
in order to eliminate “incoherent” hypotheses from the word lattice;
2. sortal information and selectional restrictions are used by Semantic Con-
struction and Semantic Evaluation to disambiguate polysemous expressions
and structural/referential ambiguities; the resulting conceptual representa-
tion is the basis for Transfer and Generation;
3. conceptual information from the domain model is used in the determination
of the speech-event type of an utterance; a hierarchy of speech-event types
for the VERBMOBIL demonstrator scenario is also part of the domain model;
4. the information in the domain model is used to build up a context represen-
tation, i.e. a semantic representation of the utterances in a dialogue. This
context representation is used in the interpretation process.
Note that these tasks are partly independent from each other, partly related, and
pose different requirements for the domain model. These different requirements
have to be integrated into a single, consistent domain model.
4.1 Sort Hierarchy and Syntactic Parsing
Examining the word-hypotheses lattices produced by a recognizer besides perfect
reproductions of the spoken utterances one finds
1. syntactically and semantically correct sentences, which do not match the
spoken utterance; detecting such cases would require a precise pragmatic
analysis, thus one just can hope that such cases some how fit into the on-
going discourse;
2. syntactically correct, but semantically deviant sentences, which can be de-
tected by the application of selectional restrictions as shown below;
3. strings of words with no recognizable syntactic structure, which are dis-
carded by the grammar.
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In order to test the selectional restrictions most lexical entries are augmented by a
“sort”-feature, whose value is associated with a concept of the domain model. The
grammar has to provide for the percolation of the sortal information and to test it
at appropriate grammar rules. Though these tests lead to wrong results in cases of
type coercion or metonomies (cf Section 3.3), they are nevertheless necessary to
detect recognizer results of the second type.
Consider the following examples where the first one is a recognizer mismatch,
while the second is a case of type coercion (violations of sortal restrictions are em-
phasized):
(14) a. Dann muß ich drei Uhr auf den Freitag verschieben.
b. I have to postpone three o‘clock to friday.
(15) a. Dann muß ich Dreyer auf den Freitag verschieben.
b. I have to postpone Dreyer to friday.
c. (lit.: I have to postpone the meeting with Dreyer to friday.)
If the process of semantic construction should not be burdened with the task to se-
lect the semantically sensible readings out of the parsing results, a solution to this
dilemma, i.e. discarding meaningless utterances, but still have a chance to interpret
cases of type coercion, is to apply the test of the selectional conditions as a soft con-
straint, which gives each selectional clash a penalty instead of immediatelly reject-
ing it. Thus the application of selectional restrictions results in an ordering, where
the “sortally” best readings are presented first to semantic construction process. 
To provide tests for selectional restrictions the grammar rules have to be aug-
mented by two kinds of features. At first the selectional conditions have to be
percolated from the lexicon to the respective constituents. Secondly, whenever a
daughter which serves as an argument or adjunct, is adjoined to a constituent, it
has to be checked whether the selectional conditions are met. 	
Additionally the lexical entries, with the exception of some classes of func-
tional words, are augmented by their sortal information which are associated with
 Note that this ordering thus follows the strategy of preferential disambiguation as described in
[Quantz, Schmitz 94].
 	If this test should be applied to modifiers of nouns is still an open question. In the case of verb
nominalizations, which still possess some kind of argument structure, such tests seem to be neces-
sary, but what about the rest of the nouns? The extent to which the test of selectional restrictions
has to be performed is additionally language-dependent. While German e.g. is quite free in this
respect in conjoining NPs, in Japanese the nouns of a NP-conjunct must be subsumable under the
same sort.
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concepts of the domain model.
 Lexical entries with an argument structure, such
as verbs, adjectives, and prepositions also state conditions on the sorts of their ar-
guments.
There are two types of tests to check selectional restrictions:
 A subsumption test between the sort of an argument position and the sort of
the possible argument, where the first one has to subsume the second one.
The same holds between the sort of a phrase and the sort of an adjunct.
 Checking whether a specific relation (a BACK-role) holds between two ar-
guments, as it is the case for semantically empty verbs such as to be or to
have. A distinctive feature for to be in the definitorial reading is that the sort
of the subject has to be subsumed by the sort of predicate noun.
Since the sorts are BACK-concepts and the subsumption test is performed us-
ing the subsumption process of BACK, which differs from the notion of subsump-
tion in unification, the test of the selectional restrictions is performed after the ap-
plication of the parsing process.  The application of the selectional tests after the
parser process has the drawback that the analysis is not directly cancelled, when
a sortal mismatch is detected. But this strategy opens the opportunity to trigger
further reasoning processes, as e.g. for interpreting type coercion on sortally ille-
gal analyses if no correct analysis has been found. It should also be noted that the
proper analysis of type coercion effects may depend on material analysed after the
sortal mismatch.
As mentioned above the selectional conditions are soft constraints modeled as
a bonus system. Each successfull application of such a condition increments the
bonus counter by 1. Normalizing the total bonus figure with the number of all ap-
plications of selectional conditions of the utterance gives a measure for the selec-
tional quality of an analysis. Thus we get the following “soft” quality criteria:

At present, where the main emphasis is laid on the construction of the domain model, the as-
sociation between sorts and concepts is simply a 1-1 mapping, which will be exchanged by a more
sophisticated treatment of the lexeme-concept-mapping along the approaches described in [Bier-
wisch 83] and [Pustejovsky 89, Pustejovsky 93a].
 It might be argued that the typed feature structures as being used in HPSG or the mapping of
ISA-Hierarchies into unifiable term structure (TFS) as proposed in [Mellish 88] allows a kind of
subsumption inside the unification process. But these representation structures are less expressive
than a description logic (DL) like BACK, so that the mapping from a DL-structure into a TFS to
avoid the construction and maintenance of multiple models, which provide the domain knowledge,
will throw away some necessary information.
36 4. DOMAIN MODELING IN VERBMOBIL
Nsuccesses
Ntests
 
 
 literal meaning
  non-literal meaning or acoustic recognition error
This bonus system needs one additional refinement in order to get a better treat-
ment of pronouns. With the exception of 1st and 2nd person personal pronouns
and some other pronouns, which refer explicitly to persons, the sort of a pronoun
ought to be subsumable by any other sortal concept. The only concept that ful-
fills this condition is the concept NOTHING, which is very undesirable, because it
also denotes a mismatch. Thus the remaining pronouns get a special signature onto
which the subsumption test is not applied and their bonus is a figure slightly smaller
than one. The reason for this smaller figure is twofold. On the one hand the sortal
appropriateness of this analysis has still to be confirmed by the reference identi-
fication process of the DRT. On the other hand, if the grammar allows a pronoun
being analyzed as a NP, as in
(16) a. an den (termin) habe ich nicht gedacht.
b. i forgot that date.
and when the definite article and the pronouns have the same form, then there are
cases where it is by syntactic means nearly impossible not to analyse a “... Pron
N ...”-sequence also as a sequence of two NPs. By the smaller figure for pronouns
the interpretation of such a sequence as “... Art Noun ...” gets a better score, which
is in most cases the appropriate reading.
Also prepositions need some special treatment for two reasons. Firstly, when
a preposition serves just as a case marker for a PO-verb it lacks any sortal require-
ment on an NP. Therefore in this case no selectional test should be applied. Sec-
ondly, the sort of a preposition is usually its thematic role. Now the most frequent
prepositions often denote a broad variety of thematic roles, where each one has dis-
tinguished requirements on the sort of its argument. If this subsumption test can
not be performed on the fly, it results in numerous readings of the same syntactic
structure. Therefore during the parsing only a very general sort is ascribed to a
preposition, which is then refined, when due to the subsumption test the appropri-
ate thematic role can be determined.
4.2 Conceptual Disambiguation and Representation
Information from the conceptual hierarchy is used both for conceptual disambigua-
tion (interpretation task) and for conceptual representation (representation task).
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Thus the conceptual information modeled in the conceptual hierarchy is motivated
by requirements stemming from:
1. contrastive analyses for the transfer from German to English;
2. the determination of relevant information for resolving an ambiguous map-
ping from German expressions into concepts.
We will illustrate this by considering the translation of prepositions. First, a con-
trastive analysis yields for each German preposition a set of corresponding En-
glish prepositions. Having established the set of possible translations of a German
preposition, the next step is to determine the information relevant for choosing the
appropriate translation in a given utterance. In doing so, one has to decide whether
to treat prepositions occurring in (optional) complements and in and free adjuncts
homogeneously:
(17) ich muß sagen mir wa¨r’s dann lieber wenn wir die ganze Sache auf Mai
verschieben.
(18) Wir treffen uns in der Eingangshalle des Czerczinsky mit den Unterla-
gen.
As Pollard and Sag point out, one difference between optional complements and
free adjuncts is that the latter can occur with a wide range of heads and contribute a
more or less uniform semantic content, whereas optional complements are more re-
stricted and their semantic contribution depends idiosyncratically on the head [Pol-
lard, Sag 87, p. 136]. Therefore, the translation of prepositions occurring in (op-
tional) complements usually depends on the English verb chosen. For free adjuncts
the translation of the preposition is more difficult, however, depending mainly on
1. the internal argument, i.e. the noun phrase constituting the prepositional
phrase together with the preposition;
2. the external argument, i.e. the phrase modified by the prepositional phrase.
Both syntactic and semantic information about the internal and the external argu-
ment can be relevant for translation.
Having sketched this general methodology, it should be noted that there are two
main problems concerning the details. For one thing, there are conceptual differ-
ences which are irrelevant for translation from German to English but seem too
important to be ignored in the conceptual hierarchy. Thus the German preposition
‘in’ can be used with spatial and temporal noun phrases and is in both cases trans-
lated by the English preposition ‘in’:
38 4. DOMAIN MODELING IN VERBMOBIL
(19) a. Wir treffen uns in der Eingangshalle.
b. We will meet in the hall.
(20) a. Wir treffen uns in zwei Wochen.
b. We will meet in two weeks.
This indicates that focussing solely on the linguistic level, i.e. transfer from Ger-
man to English can produce “conceptually weird” hierarchies.
On the other hand, contrastive analyses might yield “overspecified” concepts.
Consider the translation pair
(21) a. Mein Bu¨ro ist im zweiten Stock.
b. My office is on the second floor.
It could be argued that ‘Stock’ in German is conceptualized as a three-dimensional
container, whereas ‘floor’ in English is conceptualized as a two-dimensional plane.
Now we could either try to model this in the conceptual hierarchy by having
conceptual relations specializing ‘located’, e.g. ‘located in building part’; or we
could decide to use a general representation based on located. Note that the choice
will have impact on the Transfer/Generation task. In particular, it is not yet clear
whether the conceptual representation should unambiguously determine the En-
glish lexemes to be used, or whether the choice of lexemes is done by Generation
on the basis of the conceptual representation.
It should be noted that the conceptual disambiguation of an expression can thus
be triggered by two different requirements:
1. in order to determine the corresponding target-language expression (repre-
sentation task);
2. in order to determine the conceptual content of another expression, e.g. a
functor or an argument of the expression (interpretation task).
4.3 Determination of Speech-Event Types
Given the demonstrator scenario, namely the appointment scheduling by business
partners, the determination of the speech-event type of an utterance is crucial for an
We have a slight preference for the latter approach, in which the choice of on the second floor
instead of in the second floor is treated by Generation on the basis of English-specific, idiosyncratic,
syntactic selectional restrictions.
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adequate translation. First, it should be noted that this scenario is a highly conven-
tionalized setting. This explains why most verbs occur frequently in stereotypical
phrases, i.e. prefabricated utterances that express recurrent communicative func-
tions [Coulmas 81]. It is a well know fact that the translation of theses phrases
is—due to their intercultural variance—problematic.
The following examples will show the impact of the speech-event type of an
utterance on its translation (see [Schmitz 94] for a detailed presentation). First,
consider the following two utterances:
(22) a. Ich muß sagen mir wa¨r’s dann lieber wenn wir die ganze Sache auf
Mai verschieben. Geht es da bei Ihnen auch?
b. I must say that I’d rather postpone the whole matter until May then.
Would that suit you?
(23) a. Wo sollen wir uns denn treffen? Geht es bei Ihnen?
b. Where shall we meet then? Can we meet in your office?
Though the second parts of these utterances are almost identical (‘Geht es da bei
Ihnen auch?’ vs. ‘Geht es da bei Ihnen?’) their respective translations are com-
pletely different due to their different communicative function. In the first example
‘Geht es da Ihnen auch?’ is a request to comment on a proposed date, whereas in
the second example ‘Geht es bei Ihnen?’ is a query whether a meeting can take
place in the office of the dialogue partner. We thus have to know the speech-event
type of these utterances in order to chose the adequate translation.
Second, consider the following parts of an interpreted dialogue [Bade et al. 94,
App. II, No. 25] (again pauses and noises have been deleted from the transcrip-
tion):
(24) PIL: Dann wu¨rde ich doch sagen, am Freitag, .. . dem sechsten Mai
wu¨rde das gut passen. Vielleicht so gegen neunzehn Uhr?
GRA: (Then) on Friday, May sixth around seven?
In the VERBMOBIL data utterances like ‘ich schlage vor’, ‘ich wu¨rde vorschla-
gen’, ‘ich ha¨tte vorzuschlagen’, ‘dann ko¨nnte ich Ihnen aber noch anbieten’ are
frequently used to introduce a proposal of a date. These verbal phrases are gener-
ally not compositionally interpreted into the target language.
Note that we have deleted information concerning pauses and noises from the transcriptions.
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These examples, and the VERBMOBIL data in general, indicate that a compo-
sitional translation of the propositional content of utterances is not adequate for
certain speech-event types. Instead in these cases it is rather the speech-event type
itself, together with additional information, e.g. a temporal description of the date,
which is the equivalent of translation. It is therefore important to determine the
speech-event type of an utterance, in order to
1. determine the equivalent of translation;
2. decide whether certain phrases are used stereotypically or compositionally;
3. chose adequate lexicalizations for the respective speech-event type in the tar-
get language.
The domain model contains a hierarchy of speech-event types, such as ‘Vorschlag’
(proposal), ‘Annahme’ (acceptance) or ‘Ablehnung’ (declination), which will be
presented in detail in Section 6.5.
Speech-event types as we define them here comprise more information then
the mere illocutionary act in Austin’s terms [Austin 62]). Each speech event type
is defined in such a way that it combines a certain proposition with a particular illo-
cution. These speech-event types resemble Wittgestein’s Sprachspiele [Wittgen-
stein 56]. It is obvious that the set of language games is unlimited, therefore we
only defined a set of speech event types that are characteristic for the scenario, i.e.
appointment scheduling dialogues (for a definition of the speech-event types used
for the VERBMOBIL-demonstrator cf. [Schmitz, Jekat-Rommel 94]).
In order to automatically assign speech-event types to utterances, we take the
following knowledge into account:
micro-structural information: Here we consider syntactic information, seman-
tic information concerning both words and sentences as well as local prag-
matic information of a single utterance (without its context).
macro-structural information: Here we consider global pragmatic information
resulting from the overall discourse structure and the background knowledge
about calendar structures.
Some of this information, namely the conceptual content of (parts of)the utterances
and calendar information is provided by the domain model, whereas other informa-
tion is provided by Syntax or Semantic Construction. Our approach for the auto-
matic assignment of speech event types to utterances is described in [Schmitz 94].
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Though the speech-event hierarchy itself is domain specific, determining the
speech-event type of an utterance is crucial for cooperative dialogues in general.
It should be noted that the general approach used for the determination of speech-
event types, namely the combination of micro-structural and macro-structural in-
formation modeled as preference rules can be applied to other scenarios as well.
4.4 Context Representation
Finally, one task of the domain model is to provide the concepts used to build up a
context representation. The basic idea underlying this context representation is to
provide macro-structural information useful for processing subsequent utterances,
e.g. for determining their speech-event type of for resolving anaphora or ellipses.
Though the general purpose of a context representation is thus clear, there are at
least two open questions concerning the details.
First, in the demonstrator scenario the dialogues contain mostly English utter-
ances and only few German utterances. In particular, only one speaker produces
German utterances, whereas the other one speaks English. As long as there is no
analysis of the English utterances, a context representation is neither feasible nor
useful, since the German utterances are only represented in isolation. It has been
agreed to use dialogues conducted entirely in German to test the contextual repre-
sentation until an English analysis is available.
Second, it is not yet clear what exactly has to be represented in the context rep-
resentation. A minimal representation comprising the speech-event type of an ut-
terance and the temporal referents has been suggested at various workshops and
project meetings (e.g. by Birte Schmitz and Christa Hauenschild):
(25) a. Dann lassen Sie uns doch noch einen Termin ausmachen.
o1 :: sprecher:s1 and init terminabsprache and
no(vorgaenger sprechhandlung)
b. Wann wa¨r’s Ihnen denn recht?
o2 :: sprecher:s1 and aufforderung vorschlag and
vorgaenger sprechhandlung:o1
c. Also ich dachte noch in der na¨chsten Woche, auf jeden Fall noch
im April
o3 :: sprecher:s2 and positiver vorschlag and
vorgaenger sprechhandlung:o2 and
zeit referenz:t1 and zeit referenz:t2
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t1 :: in monat:april
t2 :: in woche:14
d. Ja, am Dienstag den sechsten April ha¨tt’ ich noch einen Termin frei
allerdings nur nachmittags
o4 :: sprecher:s1 and positiver vorschlag and
vorgaenger sprechhandlung:o3 and zeit referenz:t2
t2 :: am wochentag:dienstag and am datum:6 and
in monat:april and am tageszeit:nachmittag
e. Geht es da bei Ihnen auch?
o5 :: sprecher:s1 and aufforderung stellungnahme and
vorgaenger sprechhandlung:o4
Such a representation can be used as a basis both for Transfer/Generation and for
determining the speech-event type of the subsequent utterance. By combining
the temporal descriptions in the various utterances it can be detected whether a
proposed date is refined (the temporal description can be consistently added) or
whether a new date is proposed (the temporal description is inconsistent with the
temporal description of the previously proposed date).
Note that such a representation should be seen as the minimal basis, which
might be augmented if more information is needed. For example, it has to be seen
whether the exact determination of temporal referents is necessary. Consider the
following example:
(26) a. Donnerstag in der ersten Juni-Woche ist bei mir schon belegt , wie
wa¨r’s denn dann am Montag drauf am siebten Juni ?
b. am siebten Juni habe ich morgens leider eine Konferenz , wenn Sie
also nachmittags kommen ko¨nnten das wa¨re okay
c. leider hab’ ich erst Montag Abend Zeit und ich denke daß das dann
zu spa¨t wird , deshalb schlage ich vor daß wir das auf Donnerstag
verschieben
Obviously ‘Donnerstag’ in (c) refers to Thursday, June 10. While it is easy to de-
tect that (c) contains a new proposal and not a refinement (‘Montag’ and ‘Don-
nerstag’ cannot be consistently combined), it takes more complex reasoning to de-
termine the part of the previously proposed date which is, so to speak, kept con-
stant (namely the week in this example). Note that it is not crucial to determine
this information in order to translate the utterance—‘Donnerstag’ is rendered by
‘Thursday’ regardless to which Thursday it refers.
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Interestingly, there are examples in the dialogues in which misunderstandings
arise wrt the exact reference of a proposed date:
(27) ja am Dienstag den sechsten April ha¨tt’ ich noch einen Termin frei
allerdings nur nachmittags. geht es da bei Ihnen auch?
(28) oh das is’ schlecht , da habe ich um vierzehn Uhr dreissig einen Termin
beim Zahnarzt. aber Donnerstag Vormittag so um neun wa¨r’ mir recht
(29) ist das der achte April?
(30) Oh ich dachte eigentlich an den fu¨nfzehnten April. eine Woche spa¨ter
In principle, default rules could be used to copy all the parts of a previously fo-
cused date which are not explicitly specified for a newly proposed date. Or more
accurately, one might copy the “more general information”, e.g. week, month, and
year if a new day is proposed; also the day if a new time is proposed, etc. We
will have to investigate this problem more closely in future work. Here we just
want to emphasize that it is still an open question to which degree such a deter-
mination is needed for the VERBMOBIL project. From a representational point of
view, i.e. considering the representational basis for Transfer/Generation it seems
to be dispensable (whereas it would be indispensable for automatic appointment-
scheduling systems). Determination of reference might be needed for the interpre-
tation of subsequent utterances, however.
A major issue concerns the resolution of anaphora and ellipses. Consider the
following examples:
(31) a. der Termin den wir neulich abgesprochen haben
b. am zehnten an dem Samstag da kann ich doch nich’;
c. wir sollten einen anderen ausmachen.
First consider the verb ‘kann’ in (b). Usually, the verb ‘ko¨nnen’ subcategorizes
for an infinitive construction, e.g. ‘ich kann teilnehmen’. To parse (b)
1. we either have to treat it as an ellipsis and have to decide whether to “add”a
missing infinitive such as ‘teilnehmen’;
This phenomenon has been analyzed in detail by Ju¨rgen Kunze at the TP11 Workshop in Berlin
(6.–8. April 94).
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Top
Entität
grundlegende Einheiten
des Gegenstandsbereichs
Konzept
abstrakte Dinge wie Maße,
Dimensionen, Raumregionen
liefern Hilfskonstruktionen 
zu den Entitäten
Figure 4: Topl-level categories in LEU/2 [Klose et al 92].
2. or we have to add a lexical entry allowing ‘ko¨nnen’ to act as an intransitive
verb.
The second solution is more adequate in the VERBMOBIL demonstrator scenario
since it avoids complex reasoning necessary for resolving the “ellipsis” but irrel-
evant for translating the utterance.
Similarly, it is not clear whether the anaphor ‘da’ in (b) has to be resolved. It is
important to recognize that ‘da’ is used anaphorically and that it refers to a temporal
entity (this information is, for example, used to determine the speech-event type).
However, the information that ‘da’ refers to Saturday, 10 seems to be irrelevant
for translation. Again, one might implement default rules stating that anaphoric
temporal expressions always refer to the date currently focussed on (this seems to
be a quite accurate heuristics wrt the collected dialogues).
We think that these examples show that the relevance of such phenomena
within VERBMOBIL has to be carefully analyzed. Whereas in some cases a deep
analysis and a resolution of ambiguities is necessary for translation, there will also
be cases where translation can be achieved without such a deep analysis. It might
be more adequate to provide underspecified representations for these cases in or-
der to avoid redundant time-consuming inference processes. In other words, one
has to decide whether a particular disambiguation is required by the application,
i.e. translation, or by the formalism itself, i.e. HPSG or DRT. In the latter case it
is more appropriate to adopt the formalism to the translation task instead of doing
irrelevant disambiguations.
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thing
object quality process
Figure 5: Top-level categories in PENMAN [Penman 89].
5 Designing Ontologies
There are a number of NLP systems which use knowledge bases containing con-
ceptual hierarchies or ontologies. A comparison of the respective basic categories
used in
 LEU/2 [Klose et al 92] (Figure 4),
 PENMAN [Penman 89] (Figure 5),
 KBMT-89 [Goodman and Nirenburg 91] (Figure 6),
 an CYC [Lenat, Guha 90] (Figure 7)
reveals various possibilities of modeling these top-level categories. We think that
the main reason for the differences between these ontologies stems from the fact
that that they are used for rather different tasks in the respective systems.
LEU/2 is a system modeling text understanding and its knowledge base is used
to support different types of inferencing, namely
 to analyze linguistic surface structure,
 to compose an internal conceptual representation of the contents of the text,
 to support reasonable question answering, and
 to provide access to implicit text knowledge. [Klose 93, p. 63]
PENMAN is a system for Text Generation system and its knowledge base is
used mainly to support generation. KBMT is a system for Machine Translation, in
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event force object property
Figure 6: Top-level categories in KBMT [Goodman and Nirenburg 91].
Thing
IndividualObject Intangible RepresentedThing
CollectionStuff
IntangibleStuff
InternalMachineThing
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Attribute
SomethingOccurring Process
AttributeValue
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SomethingExisting
TangibleObject
CompositeTangible&IntangibleObject
TangibleStuff
AbsoluteAttribValue
RelativeAttribValue
QualitativeAttribValue
NonPhysicalAttribValue
PhysicallyPerceivableAttribValue
Event
IntangibleObject
Intelligence
Figure 7: Top-level categories in CYC [Lenat, Guha 90].
which the ontology acts like an interlingua. The CYC project aims at developing
a huge, task-independent knowledge base, which contains common-sense knowl-
edge required for all types of “intelligent systems”.
Investigations in a quite different area, namely cognitive development , may
give additional insights how to represent conceptual knowledge and to relate it to
language. In [Keil 79, Keil 89] the development of ontological knowledge is in-
vestigated, where natural kinds are the subject of the first monograph while the
second one concentrates more on nominal kinds. Phenomena, where ontological
knowledge shows up, are:
 sentences, which are neither true nor false, but anomaluous such as “The
table is hungry.”,
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 naturalness and similarity of classes of concepts, where e.g. a class consti-
tuted by (Human, Animal, Plant) is easier to grasp than (Human, Miner-
als, Number), while in a class, e.g. consisting (Human, Animal) the con-
cepts are more similar to each other than in (Human, Plant),
 copredication, i.e. not all pairs of predicates are sensible, as e.g.
+ X is big and red,
- X is ungrammtical and waterproof.
All these different phenomena address the problem of predicability, namely
which predicates can be combined with which natural language terms so that the
predicate-term-combination is sensible and a truth value can be assigned to it
[Sommers 65]. As a consequence predicability imposes quite strict criteria on the
organisation of ontological knowledge in a highly structured manner namely a non-
tangling tree.
“In Sommers’ theory, there is a more structured relation between pred-
icates and terms. Two terms are of the same type if and only if all pred-
icates that span term t
 
also span t

. Similarily, two predicates P
 
and
P

are of the same type if they span exactly the same sets of terms. If
term t
 
is spanned by a subset of the predicates that span t

, then t
 
is a member of a category C while t

is a member of a category sub-
ordinate to C. An essential part of this theory is that terms and pred-
icates always sort themselves out in the same manner; that is, either
two terms share exactly the same predicates, or one shares a subset
of the other’s predicates, or they share no predicates at all. There can
never be a case where two terms have intersecting sets of predicates.”
[Keil 79, p.14]
Applying these criteria to a tree of predicates gives a tree that has no diamonds
in it, i.e. no subordinate concept has two or more mother concepts immediately
preceding it. It should be kept in mind that these criteria apply to concepts, not
to words, so that a word like bat will express two concepts, one below Artifact
This so called “M-constraint” states that no tree should include an “M” or “W”-shaped
substructure.
I.e. the occurence of such “diamonds” in the real world, makes it hard to learn and understand
phaenomena related to it. This may be one reason, why quantum physics, e.g. the wave-particle
dichotomy, is not easily understandable.
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and one below Animal. Such a separation of a word into several concepts is not
only necessary for polysemous words, but also for heterotypical words where the
concepts they express are related by more functional aspects [Sommers 71, Bier-
wisch 83].
In numerous developmental studies Keil has shown that though the tree struc-
ture becomes more elaborated and partly restructured during a child’s growing up,
the tree structure remains surprisingly stable not only between children and adults
from the same social environment, but also between different cultural surround-
ings [Keil 79]. The most upper part of an ontology according to these studies is
shown in Figure 8.
The developmental studies reported in [Keil 89] are centered around nominal
kinds, such as moral acts, artefacts etc.. The setting in these studies was to give the
children definitions of such terms in the form of little stories and then to ask them,
whether the action or thing can be an X. In general the results indicate that there is
a shift from mere perceptual similarity over characteristic features to definitorial
conditions (necessary and/or sufficient ones). But this shift does not occur as a
general and simultaneous advance in all conceptual domains, but is on the contrary
quite domain specific. Keil concludes from these findings, that the construction of
a causal model or theory for a domain is the driving force of this shift. And if there
is no such causal model for a domain, then also adults use perceptual similarity or
characteristic feature as a fallback strategy.
6 VERBMOBIL Domain Model Version 1.0
6.1 The Description-Logic Systems BACK and FLEX
We use the Description-Logic (DL) systems BACK and FLEX to model the VERB-
MOBIL domain model. In this section we will briefly sketch the main ideas of DL-
systems. BACK V5 is described in detail in [Hoppe et al. 93]. FLEX is an exten-
sion of the BACK system, which is currently developed at TU Berlin to meet the
specific requirements arising in the VERBMOBIL application [Quantz et al. 94].
Description Logics (DL) can be seen as a formal elaboration of the ideas un-
derlying Semantic Networks [Quillian 68] and Frames [Minsky 75]. Following
the debate on the lacking formal foundation of these representation formats in the
mid-70’s, Brachman proposed the representation language KL-ONE, which is de-
scribed in an overview, which was circulated in the beginning of the 1980’s and
was finally published in 1985 [Brachman, Schmolze 85]. In the last decade, sub-
6.1 The Description-Logic Systems BACK and FLEX 49
EventsPhysical Objects
Aggregates
milk, water fight, kiss
intentional
 Events
Things with 
 spatial location
All Things love, fear
Objects story, ideaAbstract
nonintentional
 Events
thunderstorm, sunrise
Solid Objects
car,  refrigeratorLiving Things
Animals Plants flower, tree
Nonsentient Beings pig, rabbit
Sentient Beings woman, boy
Functional Artefacts
Figure 8: The ontology in [Keil 79, p.16].
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product    anything
chemical product    product
biological product    product & not(chemical product)
company    some(produces,product)
produces    domain(company)
chemical company   company & all(produces,chemical product)
some(produces,chemical product)  high risk company
toxipharm :: chemical product
biograin :: biological product
chemoplant :: chemical company
toxiplant :: atmost(1,produces) & produces:toxipharm
Figure 9: A sample DL modeling.
stantial theoretical research concerning complexity and decidability of different di-
alects of Description Logics has been conducted (e.g. [Donini et al. 91]). In par-
allel, several DL systems have been implemented and used in various applications
(e.g. [Brachman et al. 91, Hoppe et al. 93, Quantz, Schmitz 94]).
In DL one typically distinguishes between terms and objects as basic language
entities from which three kinds of formulae can be formed: definitions, descrip-
tions, and rules (see the sample modeling on page 50 below). A definition has the
form t
n
 
  t and expresses the fact that the name t
n
is used as an abbreviation for the
term t. A list of such definitions is often called terminology (hence also the name
Terminological Logics). All DL dialects provide two types of terms, namely con-
cepts (unary predicates) and roles (binary predicates), but they differ with respect
to the term-forming operators they contain. Common concept-forming operators
are: conjunction (c
 
u c

), disjunction (c
 
t c

), and negation (	 c), as well as
quantified restrictions [Quantz 92] such as value restrictions (r:c), which stipu-
late that all fillers for a role r must be of type c, or number restricitions (
n r:c or
n r:c), stipulating that there are at least or at most n role-fillers of type c for r.
Role-forming operators are, besides conjunction, disjunction, and negation, role
composition (r
 
.r

), transitive closure (r), inverse roles (r ) and domain or range
restrictions (cjr or rjc). In a description, an object is described as being an instance
of a concept (o :: c), or as being related to another object by a role (o
 
:: ro

).
Rules have the form c
 
 c

and stipulate that each instance of the concept c
 
is
also an instance of the concept c

.
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conc_1high risk 
company
Figure 10: The net representation of the sample modeling. ‘conc 1’ is the concept
some(produces,chemical product).
The example in Figure 9, whose net representation is shown in Figure 10 il-
lustrates the most important aspects of a DL modeling. One role and five concepts
are defined, out of which four are primitive (only necessary, but no sufficient con-
ditions are given). Furthermore, the modeling contains one rule and four object
descriptions.
In DL, such a modeling is regarded as a set of formulae . Given the formal
semantics of a DL, such a set of formulae will entail other formulae, i.e., there is an
entailment relation j  . Now the service provided by DL systems is basically to
answer queries whether some formula is entailed by a modeling. The following
list contains examples for the types of queries that can be answered by a DL system:
  j  t
 
v t

Is a term t
 
more specific than a term t

, i.e., is t
 
subsumed by t

? In the sam-
ple modeling, the concept ‘chemical company’ is subsumed by ‘high risk
company’, i.e., every chemical company is a high risk company.
  j  t
 
u t

v 
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Are two terms t
 
and t

incompatible or disjoint? In the sample modeling,
the concepts ‘chemical product’ and ‘biological product’ are disjoint, i.e., no
object can be both a chemical and a biological product.
  j  o :: c
Is an object o an instance of concept c (object classification)? In the sample
modeling, ‘toxiplant’ is recognized as a ‘chemical company’.
  j  o
 
:: r:o

Are two objects o
 
,o

related by a role r, i.e., is o

a role-filler for r at o
 
?
In the sample modeling, ‘toxipharm’ is a role-filler for the role ‘produces’ at
‘toxiplant’.
  j  X :: c
Which objects are instances of a concept c (retrieval)? In the sample mod-
eling, ‘chemoplant’ and ‘toxiplant’ are retrieved as instances of the concept
‘high risk plant’.
  fg j  
Is a description  inconsistent with the modeling (consistency check)? The
description chemoplant :: producesbiograin is inconsistent, wrt the sample
modeling, i.e., ‘biograin’ cannot be produced by ‘chemoplant’.
In Section 7 we briefly show how such queries can be used to support disambigua-
tion.
6.2 The Conceptual Hierarchy
In this section we briefly describe the main parts of the conceptual hierarchy,
namely the sort hierarchy, the entitity hierarchy, and the situation hierarchy. The
contents of the conceptual hierarchy are largely determined by the lexemes con-
tained in the demonstrator word list.
The Sort Hierarchy
The sort hierarchy shown in Figure 11 comprises the basic categories of the do-
main model and thus reflects the basic conceptual distinctions. Sortal information
of this general level will be used already in Syntax and Semantic Construction,
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abstrakt raum_zeit
temporal 
ereignis zustand
zeit
entitaet
objekt lokation
person ding
situation
top
Figure 11: The sort hierarchy.
whereas the more specific conceptual distinctions will be only used by Semantic
Evaluation.
It should be noted that on this general level the subsorts of a sort are mutually
disjoint. One motivation for this particular sort hierarchy was therefore to intro-
duce sorts comprising those subsuorts between which types shifts occur frequently.
The basic distinction is the one between RAUM ZEIT and ABSTRAKT. The for-
mer one covers objects occurring within time and/or space whereas the latter one
covers abstract objects as numbers or sciences.
The sort RAUM ZEIT splits into TEMPORAL and ENTITAET, i.e. into more tem-
poral and more spatial objects. The sort TEMPORAL can be used to account for the
systematic type shift from SITUATION to ZEIT; the sort ENTITAET for the shift from
OBJEKT to LOKATION.
The distinction between PERSON and DING is used to distinguish between ob-
jects occurring as agents, i.e. humans, institutions, and animals and non-agents.
The distinction between EREIGNIS and ZUSTAND captures the distinction between
dynamic and static situations.
The ENTITAET Hierarchy
The sort ENTITAET denotes all entities which are material, i.e. spatial objects and
substances. The subsorts of ENTITAET are LOKATION, SUBSTANZ and OBJEKT.
The design of the sort hierarchy has been based on discussions with Walter Kasper, Scott Mc-
Glashan, and Sebastian Millies.
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The LOKATION describes the spatial information of objects which is relevant for
the disambiguation of prepositions, e.g. the number of dimensions, information
about fuzzy or strict boundaries.
The distinction between LOKATION and OBJEKT is motivated by the system-
atic type shifts occurring between these entities. To handle these type shifts all
“concrete” subsorts like GARTEN (garden) , MENSCH (human being) etc. are un-
derspecified wrt to this distinction. Nevertheless there are fully specified con-
cepts for every subsort i.e. for every underspecified NAME there is a sort
NAME OBJ, which is subsumed by OBJEKT and a sort NAME LOK, sub-
sumed by LOKATION. Technically this is achieved by using a set of macros, ex-
panded by the preprocessor m4. The use of an external macroprocessor is neces-
sary, since BACK and FLEX only support macro definitions in a rather restricted
way.
During disambiguation an object of the sort NAME can be specialized to
SORT LOK in case of the location reading, or to NAME OBJ. This speciali-
sation can be triggered on demand, e.g. if it is necessary for the disambiguation of
prepositions, thereby allowing a variable depth of analysis. Furthermore, if the ob-
ject is specialized to OBJ, the information about its spatial attributes is not lost, be-
cause the different specializations (i.e. the LOK, OBJ, SUBS concepts) are linked
by specific roles.
The SITUATION Hierarchy
Situations are entities, which are temporarily and spatially determined. Thus all
roles, which are applicable on the concepts RAUM ZEIT and TEMPORAL are also
applicable on situation concepts. Lexemes expressing these concepts are either
verbs, (most) adjectives, nominalizations of verbs and nouns denoting events.
The “situation”-model provides the domain knowledge for these lexemes, while
other aspects of meaning, such as aspect/aktionsart or speech acts, are modeled at
other places. Since all these aspects contribute to the overall meaning, the different
aspects should not be inconsistent with each other.
At present the representation of SITUATION distinguishes four different points
of view onto this concept, namely the “site of the situation”, the kind of process, the
distinction between event and state,	 and the perspective from which the situation
is seen.
We would like to thank Rita Nu¨bel for the requirements on verb concepts from the point of
view of transfer and some very valuable hints.
	This distinction may in a later stage of the project rely on the calculation of aspekt/aktionsart.
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The concept for the “site of the situation” (PSYCH SIT) is subcategorized into
mental and nonmental situations, where mental situations provide a further dis-
tinction into cognitive, perceptive, and communicative situations. Note also that
cognitive situations include—atleast at present—emotional situations.
 The con-
cept of mental situations is partly motivated by the fact that not only communica-
tive processes but also cognitive and perceptive processes are related, atleast in the
VERBMOBIL setting, to speech acts.
Viewed from the process perspective, a situation either describes that some-
thing is in motion or that some entity is related to some other entity. Both process
concepts are furtheron subdivided into
motion in general:
 activity (HANDLUNG), where the actor is not changing its place, but
may make objects move around,
 movement (FORTBEWEGUNG), where the actor is involved in a change
of place,
 interaction (INTERAKTION), where atleast two actors are involved, 
relational:
 relating an entity to a spatio-temporal location (REL LOK),
 relating an entity to another entity to define or identify it (REL CLASS),
 expressing possession respective non-possession in a general sense
(REL POSS).
Finally, the perspective from which the situation is seen describes a situation as be-
ing agent centered, affected-object centered, or process centered. This distinction
may be helpful for analysing causation phenomena. Figure 12 shows the upper
structure of situations and indicates whether a role is applicable (‘+’) or not (‘–’).
The concepts described so far constitute an upper structure from which via
cross-classification more specific concepts are defined, which may then be related

The role EMOTIONAL with role fillers yes or no provides this distinction.
 It should be noted, that the represention of interactions as a direct subconcept of motion in
general is a provisional one, since it can also be seen as an activity with two actor (e.g. to make
an agreement) or as a movement (e.g. when the two actors meet). Thus it may be reasonable to
subdivide HANDLUNG and FORTBEWEGUNG into one-actor and multi-actor processes.
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situa- pro- psych ment- emoti- non- change ac- rel-
tion- cess- al-sit- onal sta- of tors type
type type type tive place
psych sit + + + - - - - + -
process + + + - - + - + -
ereignis eventP + + - - - - + -
zustand stateP + + - - - - + -
agtc- + ag + - - - - + -
process cent
affc- + aff + - - - - + -
process cent
proc- + proc + - - - - + -
process cent
mental- + + ment. + - - - + -
sit
nonmen- + + non- - - - - + -
tal-sit ment.
perzept. + + ment. perz - - - + -
kognit. + + ment. intern. no - - + -
kommu- + + ment. kom - - - + -
nikat.
emotion + + ment. intern. yes - - + -
beweg. + + + - - yes + + -
relation. + + + - - no - + +
interakt. + + + - - yes no   -
handlung + + + - - yes no 1 -
fortbeweg. + + + - - yes yes 1 -
rel lok + + + - - no - + lok
rel class + + + - - no - + class
rel poss + + + - - no - + poss
Figure 12: The upper structure of the SITUATION hierarchy.
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in some way or other to lexemes. To model such specific concepts some additional
roles are of course necessary. A first set of these roles are the thematic relations and
their more transfer-specific subrelations, which are discussed in section 6.3. Thus
besides their role in the syntactic/semantic interface they get an additional func-
tion in the conceptual modeling. Reusing thematic relations at this level may be
too straightforward, since they entail some strong commitments. But these com-
mitments don’t seem to be too severe. Furtheron, it is a matter of convenience not
to have an additional mapping process.
In the following list additional roles are described, which are necessary to
model situative concepts:
 The role HANDLUNG DIR characterizes a process as being either directed
towards the actor or away from it.
 The role INTENDIERT states whether a situation is accidental or not, while
CAUSATIV and CAUSATIV FUER denotes the causer resp. the causee of a
situation.
 The role PUNKTUELL distinguishes between punctual and extended situa-
tions.
 Finally the roles INCHOATIV and KONKLUSIV characterize the starting resp.
the ending phase of a situation.
Additionally, it seems worth to consider, whether situative concepts should be
characterized by their typical duration, because such an information may support
some decisions in the area of aspect and aktionsart. But since just typical amounts
of time can be expressed, the modeling of this feature should be done with defaults.
To put some flesh to the modeling of situations, some examples are explained in
the following. At first some conceptualisations for cognitive situations are shown:
wissen   kognition and zustand and process typ:ag cent
and emotional:no and the(agent,person) and the(theme,anything)
and sicher p:sicher
denken   kognition and ereignis and process typ:ag cent
and emotional:no and the(agent,person) and the(theme,anything)
and intendiert:yes
einfallen   kognition and ereignis and process typ:aff cent
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and emotional:no and the(experiencer,person) and the(c o s,anything)
and c o s type:kreativ and punktuell:yes
WISSEN is a agent-centered state with SICHER P indicating that the THEME is
for the actor sure knowledge as opposed to e.g. the concept GLAUBEN. The cogni-
tive event conceptualisations DENKEN und EINFALLEN differ wrt. the actor which
is in one case intentive and an agent, while in the other case it is an experiencer
and the event is punctual. They also differ wrt. to THEME being an INCREMEN-
TAL THEME in EINFALLEN.
As an additional example WARTEN and TREFFEN are both non-mental situa-
tions and activities (HANDLUNG) as well as agent-centered, but they differ wrt. to
the situation-type and TREFFEN not necessarily having a theme:
warten  handlung and nonmental sit and process typ:ag cent
and the(agent,person) and the(c o s,raum zeit)
and c o s type:def n subinterval
treffen  handlung and ereignis and nonmental sit
and process typ:ag cent and intendiert:yes
and the(local,lokation) and all(agent,person)
and atleast(2,agent) and handlung dir:zu ag
and the(teil von,interaktion).
It should be kept in mind that the main purpose of the domain model is to sup-
port the discrimination of word sense for transfer and semantic evalution and not
to give a general definition of what a lexeme may mean. A consequence of this
approach to modelling world knowledge is that it can not be entailed from the non-
existence of a thematic relation in the conceptualisation of a situation that a phrase
with the lexeme related to this conceptualisation should not have this thematic re-
lation as an adjunct. An examination whether such an entailment is sensible is
among others subject of further research.
6.3 Thematic Relations
Though thematic relations have been used in numerous approaches and an abun-
dant number of articles has been written on this subject there is still no consen-
sus on their nature and their definition in sight. But their repeated use shows the
To mention just a few of these publications, either for their influence or for giving an overview,
the reader is referred to [Gruber 65], [Fillmore 68], [Jackendoff 83, Jackendoff 90], [Rauh 88],
[Dowty 91].
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very necessity of a notion of such a kind. A closer look at these numerous ap-
proaches, allows one to mainly distinguish two different research directions. On
the one hand thematic relations are seen together with some primitive operators
such as GO, CAUSE, etc. as building stone of conceptual structure - a position, most
prominently represented by R. Jackendoff. Despite a lot of attractive features Jack-
endoff’s approach includes some very strong commitments, most notably the di-
rect mapping between the linguistic surface and the conceptual structure.
On the other hand, they are seen as part of the syntactic/semantic interface in
order to state semantic generalizations over grammatical functions. Thus their task
is either to group together different grammatical function, as is the case with the
subject of an active sentence and the by-phrase of a passive one, or to make a more
fine-grained distinction of one grammatical function, where e.g. the thematic rela-
tion of the subject is an AGENT, EXPERIENCER, or THEME depending on the type
of the verb.
In this approach thematic relations are ascribed to arguments and to adjuncts,
while sentential modifiers are excluded. Nevertheless the border between adjuncts
and sentential modifiers is not clear-cut, since some adjuncts may also serve as sen-
tential modifiers. But this would add another complication to the already exisiting
ones.
One problem that attracts much interest, possibly due to its frequency, is the
clear distinction between AGENT, PATIENT, and THEME. Usually, the AGENT per-
forms the action, the PATIENT is affected by it, and the THEME is the entity in mo-
tion or undergoing a change of state. The distinction between the first two relations
seems to be obvious, but both may also be classified as THEME, which may lead
to unexpected results depending on the ordering of the classification statements.
A solution to this probleme, which at least partially gives up the “one actant,
one relation”-principle, is the introduction of an additional causal dimension as
proposed in [Jackendoff 90] or [Grimshaw 92], which consists of AGENT and PA-
TIENT, while THEME remains in the original one. The above mentioned principle
is thus weakened to a “one actant, one relation from a dimension”-principle, thus
allowing THEME to be coindexed either with AGENT or under certain conditions
(see below) as PATIENT. This coindexing, which is explictly triggered by some
features, will prevent the classification of the AGENT as a PATIENT.
But nevertheless there are still border cases, which make it hard to decide
whether an argument is an AGENT or PATIENT. A recent approach by D. Dowty
in [Dowty 91] breaks down agent-hood as well as patient-hood into a number of
features or proto-relations, where their existence or non-existence contributes to
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Relation Super Role Domain Range
agent them rel situation raum zeit
experiencer agent situation person
patient them rel situation anything
theme them rel situation anything
way rel them rel event anything
source way rel event anything
path way rel event anything
goal way rel event anything
local lokalisiert situation raum zeit
them rel
temporal rel them rel situation temporal
instrumental them rel event objekt
benefactive them rel event person
concomitant them rel event ding
final them rel situation event
causal them rel situation event
modal them rel situation anything
comitative modal situation person
incremental theme theme event anything
patient
Figure 13: Thematic relations in Version 1.0.
the formation of an AGENT- or PATIENT-relation. This approach seems to be quite
promising, but this still has to be worked out in detail.
Another observation in [Dowty 91], namely the identification of INCREMEN-
TAL THEME as a subtype of THEME which contributes to patient-hood, is also
worth being introduced as a thematic relation. An INCREMENTAL THEME denotes
objects which are the traditional “effected” or “destroyed” objects or objects un-
dergoing a definite change of state. Examples of an INCREMENTAL THEME are
“to write an article” or “to determine the next meeting”.
Note that the distiction between AGENT and EXPERIENCER is explicitly mod-
eled by a rule stating that the experiencer has to be a non-volitional agent.
Based on the up-to-now announced requirements to describe verbs and prepo-
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sitions for the purposes of semantic evaluation and transfer a list of thematic re-
lations has been compiled, which may still be incomplete. Figure 13 contains the
thematic relations contained in the current domain model. For each relation we
also list
 its domain, i.e. the concept on which the relation is applicable,
 its range, i.e. the concept to which fillers of the relation have to belong,
 its super roles, i.e. the relations which are specialized by it.
The following list gives very provisional descriptions of the thematic roles in or-
der to get a common understanding and from which project-internal definition may
evolve. But possibly in the short run the accompanying examples, in which the rel-
evant phrase is emphasized, will do a better job.
agent is the active force in a situation.
(32) Er schreibt den Termin ins Notizbuch.
experiencer is a person being an active, but non-volitional force in a situation.
(33) Das passt gut bei mir.
Wann wa¨r’s ihnen denn recht.
theme is the entity which is moving or undergoes a change of state.
(34) Er schreibt den Termin ins Notizbuch.
Er trifft sie.
patient is the entity which undergoes a change of state induced by the action of
the agent.
(35) Er la¨dt ihn ein/aus
Er trifft sie.
way rel subsumes the following three relations ascribed to motions. Thus this re-
lation may be used as an underspecification in cases where just one of them
is necessary. Furtheron these relations are applicable not only to motion in
space.
We would like to thank Bianka Buschbeck, Rita Nuebel, Markus Egg for their contributions.
However any errors or probably still existing misconceptions fall into our responsibility.
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source is the location from which a motion event starts
(36) Er kommt aus Hamburg.
Bei mir geht’s von neun Uhr an.
path is an intermediary location during a motion event.
(37) ... und kommen dann u¨ber den Fasanengarten ru¨ber
zum Geba¨ude.
goal is the location where a motion event ends.
(38) die ganze Sache auf Montag verlegen
in die Schweiz fahren
local is the location at which a situation takes place.
(39) Ich sitze gerade in meinem Bu¨ro und sehe in meinem Kalender,
daß...
temporal rel places either a punctual or an extended situation on the time axis.
(40) In dieser Woche kann ich nicht.
Morgens bin ich im Bu¨ro.
instrumental is the object with which an event is primarily performed.
(41) Er schreibt den Termin mit dem Bleistift.
Er fa¨hrt mit dem Zug.
benefactive is a person benefitting from the event.
(42) Notieren Sie mir/fu¨r mich den Termin auf.
concomitant is an object which accompanies the performance of an event.
(43) wir treffen uns dann in der Eingangshalle mit den Unterlagen.
final is the aim of a situation.
(44) den Raum fu¨r die Tagung besorgen
causal is the reason why a state exists or an event occurs.
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Feature Range Example
in jahr Number in jahr:1994
in monat januar..dezember in monat:september
in woche 1..52 in woche:14
am wochentag montag..sonntag am wochentag:dienstag
am datum 1..31 am datum:6
am tageszeit morgen..abend am tageszeit:nachmittag
um uhrzeit 0..2359 um uhrzeit:1655
Figure 14: Major features used to model calendar information.
(45) Ich rufe mal an ... wegen der zweita¨gigen Arbeitssitzung.
modal is the manner in which a situation exists .
(46) Er kam in Eile ins Bu¨ro.
Ich kann notfalls einen Raum besorgen.
comitative is the accompanying person in a situation.
(47) Ich mo¨chte einen Termin mit ihnen ausmachen.
For a transfer, which uses these relations, these relations are not specific
enough to get the appropriate wording in the target language. In the case of en-
glish as target language one has e.g. for INSTRUMENTAL to distinguish between
INSTRUMENTAL PROPER (with) and INSTRUMENTAL TRANSPORT (by). These
more fine-grained thematic relations, called relational concepts are refinements of
thematic relations just in the same way as GOAL refines the WAY REL-relation.
6.4 Calendar Information
The domain model contains concepts and roles which can be used to describe the
temporal entities referred to in the dialogues. Since this involves mainly dates and
names of days or months, we call this information calendar information. Calendar
information can be used
1. as a basis for Transfer/Generation (according to the hypothesis that in many
cases the speech-event type and the date described is the equivalent of trans-
lation;
64 6. VERBMOBIL DOMAIN MODEL VERSION 1.0
Figure 15: The speech-event hierarchy.
2. for macro-structural preference rules in the determination of a speech-event
type (e.g. by checking whether a temporal description can be a refinement
of a previously proposed date, or whether it has to be a description of a new
alternative);
3. to detect errors resulting from speech recognition (e.g. ‘31. Juni’ is not a
valid date).
The main features used for describing calendar entities together with range restric-
tions and exemplary values are shown in Figure 14.
6.5 The Speech-Event Hierarchy
Figure 15 shows the hierarchy of speech-event types as modeled in the BACK sys-
tem. Each speech-event type corresponds to a BACK concept. In addition to that
we introduced some “artificial” concepts that cannot be regarded as speech-event
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types—these concepts play a crucial role in the process of automatically assigning
speech-event types to utterances. They are used to store already computed infor-
mation or to structure the concepts in order to allow for the formulation of prefer-
ence rules operating on a higher level. There is, for example, a speech-event type
‘akz o pos vs’ representing that the type is either an acceptance or a positive pro-
posal. The speech-event types are described in detail [Schmitz, Jekat-Rommel 94].
7 How To Use the Domain Model
There are several ways to use the domain model, which we will briefly illustrate
in this section. In principle one can distinguish between
1. subsumption/disjointness checking
2. retrieval of sub and super concepts
3. retrieval of role information
4. default-based reasoning
Note that this section is mainly meant to illustrate possible uses of the domain
model and does not describe how the domain model is actually used in the demon-
strator. This depends on the design decisions taken in the other modules.
Subsumption and Disjointness Checking
The most obvious use of a conceptual hierarchy is to check satisfaction of selec-
tional restriction by testing subsumption. If we have, for example, a selectional
restriction requiring the argument of a preposition to be a noun phrase referring to
a location, we can check whether the type of the referent of the actual noun phrase
is subsumed by LOKATION.
Subsumption checks can be implemented by using the BACK predicate
backask(subsumes(C1,C2))
which succeeds iff the concept ‘C1’ subsumes the concept ‘C2’. Note that this use
of the domain model implicitly assumes a closed world. In principle it would be
more appropriate to check whether the referent could be an instance of LOKATION
instead of asking whether it is already known to be an instance of LOKATION. Thus
we would have to call

‘n ’ is the Quintus-Prolog predicate for negation as failure.
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n(backask(disjoint(C1,C2)))
which succeeds if ‘C1’ and ‘C2’ are not disjoint, i.e. can be unified. However, we
can argue that there are ontologically essential categories for which subsumption
checking is adequate, since it yields equivalent results as disjointness checking.
Note that this equivalence holds if
subsumes(c1,c2) fails iff disjoint(c1,c2) succeeds
which in turn holds if the sub concepts of each concept are mutually disjoint.
Whereas this correspondence between subsumption and disjointness holds for
the sort hierarchy, it is not generally true for the whole domain model. Given
the open-world assumption underlying Description Logics, selectional restrictions
should be in general checked by testing disjointness. The restriction is violated
only if the concept required by the restriction and the concept actually occurring
as an argument are disjoint.
Retrieval of Sub and Super Concepts
Retrieval of sub and super concepts is another functionality provided by the do-
main model. This may be used, for example, to find more specific or more general
concepts in case a concept is not lexicalized in English. The FLEX system pro-
vides a filter mechanism which allows limited second-order predications, i.e. the
assignment of properties to concepts and roles. Thus we can mark all concepts in
the hierarchy which are lexicalized in English by adding a filter, e.g. ‘eng lex’. The
query
direct supers(Conc,[eng lex],Supers)
then retrieves the most specific concepts subsuming ‘Conc’ and satisfying the filter
‘eng lex’.
In the BACK system (direct) super and sub concepts are backtracked by
tboxget(direct super concept(Conc,Super))
tboxget(super concept(Conc,Super))
tboxget(direct sub concept(Conc,Sub))
tboxget(sub concept(Conc,Sub))
In addition to these predicates which provide information about concepts, the pred-
icate ‘msc’ provides information about objects. Given an object, this predicate re-
turns the most specific concepts it instantiates.
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Retrieval of Role Information
The programming interface of BACK allows the retrieval of information about a
particular role at an object or a concept. The predicates
tboxget(number restriction(Conc,Role,Min,Max))
tboxget(value restriction(Conc,Role,VR))
tboxget(fillers(Conc,Role,Fillers))
can be used to retrieve the the cardinality, the value restriction, and the fillers of a
role.
The FLEX system supports term-valued features, i.e. features taking concepts
or roles instead of objects as fillers. This allows the modeling of rules for concep-
utal disambiguation, as
pred:anbieten1 and the(ref comp theme rel,termin c)
  conc:termin vorschlagen c
pred:vergessen and the(ref comp theme rel,zeit c)
  conc:nicht passen c
pred:gut and the(ref,passen c)
  conc:gut passen c
pred:unguenstig and the(ref,zeit c)
  conc:schlechter termin c
Given the above predicate we can then retrieve the filler for the feature ‘conc’ at a
particular object.
Default-Based Reasoning
Finally, the FLEX system contains a nonmonotonic extension based on weigthed
defaults [Quantz, Suska 94]. In the demonstrator weighted defaults will be used
to support the automatic assignment of speech-event types to utterances.
The implementation of weighted defaults in FLEX is based on situated descrip-
tions. Thus instead of saying that an object o is an instance of a concept c, such
a description can be restricted to a particular situation. The situated description
‘o :: c in s’ thus expresses that o is an instance of c in situation s. Situations can
also be extended: if situation s

extends situation s
 
all descriptions valid in s
 
also
hold in s
 
.
Given the information modeled with weighted defaults, we can assign default
extensions to each situation. The weights of the defaults are then used to score
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these default situations and the situation with the minimal negative score is the
preferred default situation. Evaluating defaults thus yields a table which assigns
default situations to strict situations. On the basis of this table default information
can be retrieved by using the standard retrieval predicates.
8 Future Work
The experiences we made during our work on this first version of the domain model
will have considerable impact on our future work. In this final section we briefly
sketch some of the issues we want to address in future versions of the domain
model.
As has been pointed out, the domain model has to take into account require-
ments arising from rather different tasks (e.g. ordering of syntactic parses, con-
ceptual disambiguation, determination of speech-event types). One of the major
problems thus was the integration of these heterogeneous requirements into a ho-
mogeneous domain model. We plan to use two different mechanisms to facilitate
this integration:
1. the specification of requirements should include examples showing how the
information is actually intended to be used;
2. the domain model should be more transparent wrt the use of the information
it contains.
One way of realizing the second item is to explictly represent the users of each
concept and role in the domain model, e.g. by means of the filter mechanism in
FLEX.
In general, we plan to consider the use of additional tools to support the “dis-
tributive” development of the domain model. This involves, for example,
 the compilation of (parts of) the domain model from FLEX to STUF;
 the computation of differences between different versions of the domain
model.
In addition to these organizational issues, we also envisage to reconsider cer-
tain parts of the domain model. For one thing, we will probably distinguish
more carefully between thematic and conceptual relations. Thematic relations will
then be used on the linguistic level, i.e. the role ‘agent’ will be a role between
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two linguistic signs, whereas conceptual relations will be used on the referen-
tial/conceptual level, e.g. the role ‘proposer’ will be a role between two discourse
referents.
Finally, we will carefully evaluate, to which degree type shifting is relevant in
the VERBMOBIL demonstrator. Though the current domain model provides the ba-
sis for both a variable depth of analysis and a straightforward treatment of system-
atic type shifts, we still have to see, how this is actually used in the demonstrator.
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